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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of William Franklin Warren, III, 
Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002378 
Opinion No. 27643 

Heard May 17, 2016 – Filed June 29, 2016 

DISBARRED 
Disciplinary Counsel Lesley M. Coggiola and  
Deputy Disciplinary Counsel Barbara M. Seymour, for 
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
William Franklin Warren, III, Respondent, pro se. 
PER CURIAM:  In this attorney disciplinary matter, Respondent William
Franklin Warren, III, admits misconduct including, among other things,
misappropriating over $171,392 held in various trusts for which he served as 
trustee, converting client funds for his personal use, failing to perform work for 
which he had been paid, failing to return unearned fees, failing to record deeds and
other original documents, and failing to respond to inquiries by the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel (ODC).  ODC filed formal charges against Respondent, 
which resulted in a hearing before a panel of the Commission on Lawyer Conduct 
(the Panel). The Panel recommended that Respondent be disbarred, to which 
Respondent took no exception. In light of the egregious nature of Respondent's
misconduct, we disbar Respondent. 
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 I. 

 
On December 18, 2013, Respondent was placed on interim suspension by Order of 
this Court.  In re Warren, 406 S.C. 483, 752 S.E.2d 548 (2013).  The current 
proceedings arise from four separate complaints.  Respondent failed to answer the 
formal charges, and by failing to answer, Respondent thus admitted the allegations.  
Rule 24(a), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.  The factual allegations in the formal 
charges are summarized below.   
 
A. 

Misappropriation of Client Funds 

 
Respondent mismanaged and misappropriated $171,392 from three trust accounts 
for which he served as trustee,  using the stolen funds to operate his law firm and to 
support a lifestyle that he could not otherwise afford.1  We note Respondent is the 
uncle and godfather of the beneficiaries of the trusts from which he stole money.   
 
B. 

Failing to Perform Services 

 
In three different matters, Respondent undertook representation and accepted over 
$40,000 in fees, but failed to perform the services promised or reimburse fees for 
work not completed.  Following Respondent's interim suspension, the attorney 
appointed to protect Respondent's clients' interests reported being unable to find 
any operating account or trust account for Respondent's law practice and that there 
were no funds available to reimburse any monies. 
 
C. 

Mishandling of Corporate and Estate Matters 

 
Respondent collected over $20,000 in fees to perform estate planning and  
  
                                        
1 In November 2012, Respondent signed a settlement agreement promising to 
repay the stolen funds plus 8% interest, along with three confessions of judgment, 
which were to be filed in the event Respondent failed to make payments under the 
agreed-upon repayment plan set forth in the settlement agreement.  Respondent 
failed to make payments, and the confessions of judgment were filed in July 2013.   
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corporate work for a client; however, Respondent mishandled the estate plan and 
allowed the client's corporate registration to lapse for seven years, resulting in 
forfeiture of the client's corporate charter and the client incurring $1,700 in 
penalties and more than $13,000 in attorney's fees paid to different counsel to 
reinstate the corporate charter and correct the client's estate plan. 
   
D. 

Failure to Safeguard Funds 

 
Respondent prepared a will for a client, and after the client's passing, $18,000 cash 
was found in the client's home and delivered to Respondent to hold in trust.  
Respondent converted those funds, and none of the funds remained in trust at the 
time of Respondent's interim suspension. 
 
E. 

Failure to Record Original Documents  

 
Following Respondent's interim suspension, a review of client files revealed 
Respondent's possession of numerous original documents (primarily deeds 
conveying real property into living trusts, some several years old) that had not been 
filed by Respondent, despite Respondent having been paid fees to do so. 
 
F. 

Failure to Respond 

 
Respondent failed to respond to several investigative inquiries by ODC, including 
follow-up letters pursuant to In re Treacy2 advising him to file a written response. 
 
II. 
 
In light of the nature and extent of Respondent's misconduct, the Panel 
recommended Respondent be disbarred.  The Panel further recommended 
Respondent be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $244,772.22 and the 
costs of these proceedings. Respondent took no exception to the Panel report. 
2 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
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III. 
This Court "may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings, 
conclusions[,] and recommendations of the Commission [on Lawyer Conduct]."  
Rule 27(e)(2), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.  "The Rules of Professional Conduct are 
rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal 
representation and of the law itself."  Scope, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.  "This Court 
has never regarded financial misconduct lightly, particularly when such 
misconduct concerns expenditure of client funds or other improper use of trust 
funds." In re Johnson, 385 S.C. 501, 504, 685 S.E.2d 610, 611 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). As we have recognized, "[t]he primary purpose of 
disbarment . . . is the removal of an unfit person from the profession for the 
protection of the courts and the public, not punishment of the offending attorney."  
In re Burr, 267 S.C. 419, 423, 228 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1976).   
Respondent has admitted theft that has resulted in significant harm to his clients 
and failed to participate in the disciplinary investigation.  At oral argument before 
this Court, Respondent requested that his "license be taken."3  Because of the 
prevalent nature of Respondent's theft and wrongdoing, we find Respondent 
committed misconduct in the respects identified by the Panel.  Thus, we find 
Respondent violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, 
SCACR: Rule 1.1 (competence); Rule 1.2(a) (consult with client); Rule 1.3 
(diligence); Rule 1.4 (communication); Rule 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee); 
Rule 1.5(b) (communicate basis for fee); Rule 1.15 (safekeeping property); Rule 
8.1(b) (failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary 
authority); Rule 8.4(a) (misconduct); Rule 8.4(b) (criminal act); Rule 8.4 (c) 
(criminal act involving moral turpitude); Rule 8.4(d) (conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) (conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice).  We also find Respondent's misconduct 
constitutes grounds for discipline under the following Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (violation of the Rules 
3 On the eve of oral argument, Respondent requested permission to surrender his 
law license upon the condition that he be permitted to seek readmission to the Bar 
in the future. However, during oral argument, when Respondent learned his 
proposed conditional resignation was not permitted under Rule 35, RLDE, Rule 
413, SCACR, he withdrew his resignation request and asked instead to be 
disbarred. 
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of Professional Conduct); Rule 7(a)(3) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful 
demand from a disciplinary authority); Rule 7(a)(5) (engaging in conduct tending 
to pollute the administration of justice and to bring the courts and the legal
profession into disrepute or demonstrating an unfitness to practice law); and Rule 
7(a)(6) (violation of the Lawyer's Oath). 
We concur with the Panel's recommendation of disbarment.  See, e.g., In re Jones, 
413 S.C. 29, 774 S.E.2d 467 (2015) (disbarring attorney for misappropriating 
client funds and failing to communicate with clients); In re Lafaye, 399 S.C. 12, 
731 S.E.2d 282 (2012) (disbarring attorney for misappropriating client funds in 
two trust accounts); In re Crummey, 388 S.C. 286, 696 S.E.2d 589 (2010) 
(disbarring attorney for misappropriating client funds, failing to diligently pursue 
client matters, failing to communicate with clients, writing trust account checks 
that were returned for insufficient funds, and failing to cooperate with ODC); In re 
Williams, 376 S.C. 640, 659 S.E.2d 100 (2008) (disbarring attorney for 
misappropriating $400,000 of client assets and pleading guilty to one count of 
exploitation of a vulnerable adult); In re Cunningham, 371 S.C. 503, 640 S.E.2d 
461 (2007) (disbarring attorney for misappropriating approximately $70,000 in 
estate funds, failing to maintain separate trust and operating accounts, and 
providing false information to his client in an attempt to conceal his 
misappropriation of estate funds); In re Kennedy, 367 S.C. 355, 626 S.E.2d 341 
(2006) (disbarring attorney for falsifying a HUD-1 Settlement Statement, failing to 
remit loan proceeds, issuing a title insurance policy which included a forged 
signature and false certifications, misappropriating at least $280,000 in client 
funds, and pleading guilty to one count of mail fraud).   
IV. 
In light of Respondent's pervasive misconduct, Respondent is hereby disbarred, 
retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.  Within sixty days of the date of 
this opinion, Respondent shall enter into a monthly payment plan with the 
Commission on Lawyer Conduct to pay restitution in the amount of $244,722.22. 
Additionally, Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings within 
sixty days of the date of this opinion.  Further, within fifteen days of the date of 
this opinion, Respondent shall surrender his Certificate of Admission to the  
16 

  
 
 
 
 
Practice of Law and shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing he has 
complied with Rule 30, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. 
DISBARRED. 

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Didier Van Sellner, Petitioner, 
v. 
State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2014-002472 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Appeal from Orangeburg County 

The Honorable Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge  

Opinion No. 27644 

Submitted May 17, 2016 – Filed June 29, 2016 

REVERSED 
Appellate Defender Laura R. Baer, of Columbia, for 
Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, and Assistant 
Attorney General Megan H. Jameson, both of Columbia 
for Respondent. 
JUSTICE HEARN: Didier Van Sellner pled guilty to armed robbery and later 
applied for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting his counsel was ineffective for  
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advising him to take a plea deal when the State could not demonstrate all of the 
elements of armed robbery.  The PCR court denied him relief, finding he received
effective assistance of counsel. We reverse.1 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Van  Sellner was charged with armed robbery.  After consulting  with
counsel, he learned he could be subject to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole due to his prior convictions in New Jersey and New York for robbery and 
various drug offenses. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (2015). As a result of 
counsel's advice, Van Sellner decided to accept the plea offered by the State.   
At the plea hearing, the State explained that Van Sellner entered the South 
Carolina Bank and Trust (the Bank) in Orangeburg and waited in line to speak with
a teller. When it was his turn, he handed the teller a note "requesting her to give 
him [$3,000] in used bills, indicating to her not to give him any dye packs, and that 
if she did not comply he would shoot her."2 The teller partially complied by giving 
Van Sellner $492. After receiving the money, Van Sellner fled the scene. The 
police captured Van Sellner that day wearing the same clothes he had on during the 
robbery. Van Sellner confessed to the police and the FBI.   
Following the State's presentation of facts, trial counsel informed the court 
that she believed the plea was in Van Sellner's best interest based on his prior 
record and the potential that the State could seek life without the possibility of 
parole. The trial court asked Van Sellner whether he understood the elements of 
armed robbery and confirmed the State had not influenced his plea. Van Sellner 
informed the trial court that he wanted to plead guilty because he  was  trying to  
avoid returning to jail for a prolonged period of time.   
Ultimately, the trial court accepted the plea, stating, "I find that there is a
factual basis for you to plead guilty to this charge, and so I am going to accept your 
guilty  plea at  this time."  The trial court sentenced Van Sellner to twelve years'
imprisonment.   
1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.  

2 At the PCR hearing, Van Sellner testified the note said, "freeze this is a stick up, I 

have a gun please give me 3,000 dollars in large, loose, bills.  No  Games  or I'll 
 	
shoot." 
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Van Sellner subsequently filed for PCR, alleging that because he did not
display a weapon during the robbery, trial counsel incorrectly advised him to plead 
to armed robbery. At the PCR hearing, Van Sellner testified the research he 
conducted during incarceration revealed his counsel did not properly advise him on 
the law. In support, he pointed to other available charges for robbery crimes. He 
testified trial counsel told him he was "stuck," and armed robbery was the only 
possible crime he could be charged with under the circumstances. Van Sellner 
testified it was a "take it[,] or leave it[ and] get life" situation because the armed
robbery charge and sentence could not be reduced given his prior record. Van 
Sellner repeatedly testified he did not have a weapon or make any physical 
indication that he had a weapon on his person at the time of the robbery.   
Trial counsel testified that there was no evidence that Van Sellner had a gun 
during the robbery or made any representation of a weapon. Moreover, she 
testified that police reports stated Van Sellner was not armed.
The PCR court found trial counsel was not deficient for advising Van
Sellner to plead guilty to armed robbery. In denying relief, the PCR court
explained Van Sellner "failed to meet his burden of establishing any deficiency" 
because "[b]y passing the teller a note threatening her with a deadly weapon, [Van 
Sellner's] conduct comported to the armed robbery statute by alleging with words 
that he was armed with a deadly weapon." Further, the PCR court found Van 
Sellner could not establish prejudice from the alleged deficiencies "as there [wa]s
no reasonable likelihood that the result of proceeding would have been different or
that [Van Sellner] would have proceeded to trial."  
Van Sellner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.  
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the PCR court err in denying Van Sellner's application for PCR based 
on plea counsel's advice to him to plead guilty to armed robbery when the evidence 
demonstrated Van Sellner's actions during the robbery did not support a conviction 
under section 16-11-330(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015), as analyzed in 
State v. Muldrow, 348 S.C. 264, 559 S.E.2d 847 (2002)? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court gives great deference to the factual findings of the PCR court and 
will uphold them if there is any evidence of probative value to support them.  
Jordan v. State, 406 S.C. 443, 448, 752 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2013). Questions of law 
are reviewed de novo, and we will reverse the PCR court's decision when it is 
controlled by an error of law. Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 465, 765 S.E.2d 123, 
127 (2014). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Van Sellner argues he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel because plea counsel advised him to plead guilty to the
offense of armed robbery even though the facts did not support a conviction for 
armed robbery.  We agree. 
"An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must
show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced 
the defense." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). The two-part test also 
"applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel."  
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). "A defendant who enters a plea on the 
advice of counsel may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of a plea 
by showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going 
to trial."  Holden v. State, 393 S.C. 565, 572, 713 S.E.2d 611, 615 (2011) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Rolen v. State, 384 S.C. 409, 413, 683 S.E.2d 471, 474 
(2009)).
In addressing the adequacy of a PCR applicant's guilty plea, it is  proper to  
consider both the guilty plea transcript and the evidence presented at the PCR 
hearing. Id. at 573, 713 S.E.2d at 615 (citing Suber v. State, 371 S.C. 554, 558, 
640 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2007)). "[T]here is a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in
making all significant decisions in the case." Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456,
710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011). 
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Under section 16-11-330(A)3, the State may prove armed robbery by 
establishing the commission of a robbery and either one of two additional 
elements.  The State must  prove either (1) the robber was armed with a deadly  
weapon, or (2) the robber alleged he was armed with a deadly weapon, either by 
action or words, while using a representation of a deadly weapon or any object
which a person during the commission of a robbery would reasonably believe to be 
a deadly weapon. See id. 
In State v. Muldrow, this Court addressed whether words alone are sufficient 
to establish the presence or a witness's reasonable belief of a deadly weapon under 
section 16-11-330(A). 348 S.C. at 264, 559 S.E.2d at 847. There, Muldrow
entered a convenience store and gave the clerk a note that read, "Give me all your 
cash or I'll shoot you." Id. at 267, 559 S.E.2d at 849.  The clerk asked Muldrow if
he was serious, to which Muldrow responded affirmatively and told her to hurry up 
before he shot her. Id. In reviewing the plain language of section 16-11-330(A), 
this Court found that  words  alone are not sufficient  to support a conviction  for  
armed robbery. Id. at 269, 559 S.E.2d at 849–50. As a result, this Court held the 
State must show "evidence corroborating the allegation of being armed, i.e., the
use of a physical representation of a deadly weapon, to establish armed robbery."  
Id. 
3 Section 16-11-330(A) states: 
A  person who  commits robbery while armed with a pistol, dirk,  
slingshot, metal knuckles, razor, or other deadly weapon, or while 
alleging, either by action or words, he was armed while using a 
representation of a deadly weapon or any object which a person 
present during the commission of the robbery reasonably believed to 
be a deadly weapon, is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must 
be imprisoned for a mandatory minimum term of not less than ten
years or more than thirty years, no part of which may be suspended or 
probation granted. A person convicted under this subsection is not
eligible for parole until the person has served at least seven years of
the sentence. 
(Emphasis added).  
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Here, the facts presented by the State do not include the requisite 
corroborating evidence for armed robbery. During the plea hearing, the State did 
not allege Van Sellner was armed, nor did it  allege Van Sellner took any type of 
action which would allow a witness to reasonably believe he was armed.  The State
also failed to introduce any evidence to address the adequacy of Van Sellner's 
guilty plea at the PCR hearing. In neither proceeding did the State present 
sufficient evidence to satisfy the test set forth in Muldrow. Therefore, plea 
counsel's advice to Van Sellner that he could be convicted of armed robbery 
without proof of a physical representation of a deadly weapon rendered counsel's
performance deficient, and the PCR court erred in finding plea counsel effective. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the PCR court's denial of relief and grant
Van Sellner a new trial.  
BEATTY, KITTREDGE and FEW, JJ., concur. PLEICONES, C.J., 
concurring in result only. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of George Hunter McMaster, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001332 
ORDER 
The Commission on Lawyer Conduct has notified this Court that it has initiated 
proceedings pursuant to Rule 28(b)(2) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE), Rule 413, SCACR, in this matter.  We therefore transfer 
respondent to incapacity inactive status until further order of this Court.1  Rule 
28(b)(2)(A), SCACR. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
June 23, 2016 
1 Respondent was placed on interim suspension on July 2, 2014, and remains subject to the 
injunction set forth therein. See In re McMaster, 409 S.C. 48, 760 S.E.2d 413 (2014). 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Frampton Durban, Jr., Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2016-001336 and 2016-001348 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim
suspension pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
(SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver to protect the 
interests of respondent's clients pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. 
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, is 
hereby appointed to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust 
account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office 
accounts respondent may maintain.  Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by 
Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  
Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment.
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction 
to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall 
further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre Thomas 
Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly appointed by this Court.
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly 
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appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and the 
authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
 
 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
June 24, 2016 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
RE: Rule 402 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, §4, of the South Carolina Constitution, Rule 402 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules is amended to read as shown in the 
attachment to this order.  This amended rule is effective immediately, and shall 
apply to all applications for admission to practice law in South Carolina based on 
the Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) starting with the February 2017 bar 
examination.  Applications for admission based on a transfer of a UBE score from 
another jurisdiction will not be accepted for filing until May 1, 2017. 
The current version of Rule 402 shall remain in effect for the July 2016 South 
Carolina Bar Examination and shall continue to govern all aspects of admission 
based on South Carolina Bar Examinations conducted prior to February 2017.   
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  C.J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
s/ John Cannon Few  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
June 24, 2016 
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 RULE 402 

ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW 

 
(a) Purpose. This rule provides for the admission of persons to practice law in South 
Carolina. A person admitted under this rule is eligible to be a regular member of the South 
Carolina Bar under Rule 410 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  Other rules provide 
for the issuance of limited certificates of admission and pro hac vice admission in South 
Carolina. 
(b) 	 Definitions. 
(1) 	 ABA Approved Law School:  A law school that was approved by the Council of 
the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar 
Association at the time the degree was conferred.  An approved law school 
includes a school that is provisionally approved by the Council.1   
(2) 	 Board of Law Examiners:  The Board established by section (k) of this rule. 
(3)  	 Committee on Character and Fitness:  The Committee established by section 
(l) of this rule. 
(4) 	 Existing UBE Score: A Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) score previously 
obtained in South Carolina or another jurisdiction. 
(5) 		 Filing:   For the purposes of this rule, filing means: 
(i) 	 delivering the document to the Clerk of the Supreme Court; 
(ii)		 depositing the document in the U.S. mail, properly addressed to the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court, with sufficient first class postage attached; or 
(iii) 		 uploading the document or information on the Bar Admissions page of the 
South Carolina Judicial Department Website to the extent that electronic 
filing is provided by that website.2  
 
 
                                                 
 
  
 
1 Additional information on ABA Approved Law Schools is available at 
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools.html. 
2 The Bar Admissions page is located at www.sccourts.org/bar/index.cfm. 
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The date of filing shall be the date of delivery, the date of mailing, or the date of 
uploading. 
(6) MPRE:  The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination administered by 
the National Conference of Bar Examiners.3   
(7) 	 Supreme Court: The Supreme Court of South Carolina.  
(8) UBE: The Uniform Bar Examination prepared by the National Conference of Bar 
Examiners.  The UBE is composed of the Multistate Performance Test (MPT), Multistate 
Essay Examination (MEE), and the  Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), which are 
prepared by, given, and graded in accordance with the standards established by the 
National Conference of Bar Examiners.4  
(c) 	 Qualifications for Admission.  Except as provided in section (j) below, no person shall    
be admitted to the practice of law under this rule unless the person: 
(1) 	 is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; 
(2) 	 is of good moral character; 
(3)  has received a JD or LLB degree from an ABA Approved Law School.  An 
applicant who has applied to take the UBE in South Carolina and has not provided proof 
of graduation by July 10th for the July UBE or February 10th for the February UBE shall 
not be allowed to sit for the examination.  An applicant, however, who has not graduated 
may sit for the UBE in South Carolina if the law school certifies in writing that the 
applicant has completed all requirements for graduation by July 10th for the July 
examination or February 10th for the February examination; the applicant must provide 
proof of graduation by April 1st following the February examination or October 1st 
following the July examination; 
(4) 		 has been found qualified by a panel of the Committee on Character and Fitness; 
(5)  has received a score of 266 or higher on the UBE administered in South Carolina 
or any other jurisdiction.  A UBE score that is more than three (3) years old may not be 
used to satisfy this requirement.  For a UBE administered in February, this three (3) year 
period shall begin on March 1st following the examination.  For a UBE administered in 
July, this three (3) year period shall begin on August 1st following the examination.  
Applications seeking admission based on an existing UBE score from another jurisdiction 
will not be accepted until May 1, 2017;  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
3 Additional information about the MPRE is available at www.ncbex.org. 
4 Additional information regarding the content of the UBE is available at www.ncbex.org. 
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(6) has received a scaled score of at least seventy-seven (77) on the MPRE.  This 
score must be from an administration of the MPRE that occurred within three (3) years of 
the date on which the application for admission is filed with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court. While an application for admission can be filed without proof of completion of 
this requirement, applicants are warned that failure to timely submit proof of completion 
of this requirement can significantly delay admission as indicated by section (h)(2) of this 
rule; 
(7) is not disbarred, suspended from the practice of law, or the subject of any pending 
disciplinary proceeding in another jurisdiction; 
(8)   has successfully completed a Course of Study on South Carolina Law.  The 
content and method of delivery of this Course of Study shall be determined by the Board 
of Law Examiners.  The Course of Study may not be taken prior to the filing of a 
complete application with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.  Successful completion of the 
Course of Study may be used to satisfy the requirements of this rule for subsequent 
applications filed within three (3) years of the date of completion of the Course of Study.  
Applicants are warned that the failure to promptly complete this requirement can 
significantly delay admission as indicated by section (h)(2) of this rule; and 
(9) has paid the fees required by this rule and taken the oath or affirmation specified 
by section (h)(3) of this rule. 
(d) Application for Admission.  
(1)  Filing Application.  Any person desiring to be admitted to practice law under this 
rule shall file an application for admission with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.  The 
application form shall be approved by the Committee on Character and Fitness and shall 
be available on the Bar Admissions page of the South Carolina Judicial Department 
Website. An application will not be considered complete until both the fully completed 
application (along with any required attachments) and fee(s) are received by the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court.  The application fees shall be paid by check or money order made 
payable to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
(2) Applications for Admission Based on an Existing UBE Score. Applications 
based on an existing UBE Score (as defined in section (b) of this rule) will not be 
accepted for filing until May 1, 2017.  On and after that date, these applications may be 
filed at any time.  If based on a UBE Score from another jurisdiction, the applicant must 
have the score transferred to South Carolina by the National Conference of Bar 
Examiners.5  
 
                                                 
5  Information about UBE score transfers is available at www.ncbex.org/ncbe-exam-score-
services/ube-score-services. 
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The non-refundable application fee shall be $1,000.  If the applicant has been admitted to 
practice law for more than one (1) year in another state, the District of Columbia, or 
another country at the time the application for admission is filed, the applicant shall pay 
an additional fee of $750. If the application is withdrawn, the applicant shall not be 
entitled to a refund of the application fee(s) or to have the application fee(s) credited to a 
later application. 
(3) Applications for Admission Where the Applicant Will Take the UBE in 
South Carolina. Applications for admission shall be accepted from December 1st to 
January 31st for the July UBE and from August 1st to September 30th for the February 
UBE for applicants who desire to take the UBE in South Carolina.  The non-refundable 
application fee shall be: 
(i) $1,000 for applications filed from December 1st to January 10th or from 
August 1st to August 31st. 
 
(ii) $1,500 for applications filed during the remainder of the application 
periods. 
If the applicant has been admitted to practice law for more than one (1) year in another 
state, the District of Columbia, or another country at the time the application is filed, the 
applicant shall pay an additional fee of $750.  If the application is withdrawn or the 
applicant fails to sit for the examination, the applicant shall not be entitled to a refund of 
the application fee(s) or to have the application fee(s) credited to a later application.  
An applicant taking the UBE in South Carolina must sit for all portions of the 
examination in South Carolina, and may not use scores from a previous examination to 
satisfy this requirement.   
(4) Applicants Who Have Failed to Receive a Qualifying Score on Three or More 
Bar Examinations.  An applicant who has failed to receive a qualifying score on three or 
more bar examinations shall not be eligible to sit for the UBE in South Carolina until at 
least one (1) year following the administration of the last bar examination resulting in a 
non-qualifying score. For the purpose of this provision, an applicant shall be treated as 
receiving a non-qualifying score on a bar examination if:  (1) the applicant failed a bar 
examination in South Carolina prior to February 2017; or (2) the applicant sat for the 
UBE in this or any other jurisdiction and failed to receive a score of 266 or higher.  
(5) Duty to Keep Application Current.  Until admitted, an applicant is under a 
continuing obligation to keep the application for admission current and must update 
responses whenever there is an addition or a change to information previously filed with 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court.  These updates must be filed with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court along with all relevant documentation. 
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(6) Special Accommodations for Disabled Applicants.  An applicant needing 
special accommodations for the administration of the UBE in South Carolina due to a 
disability shall submit a written request for such accommodations to the Board of Law 
Examiners.  The procedure and forms to be used in making a written request shall be 
specified in the rules of the Board of Law Examiners.6  Unless the chair of the Board 
determines there is good cause to allow a late request, written requests for special 
accommodations must be submitted by November 1st for the February UBE and April 1st 
for the July UBE. 
(e) False and Misleading Information. An applicant who knowingly provides false or 
misleading information in an application (to include any attachments to the application), 
document, or statement submitted or made to the Committee on Character and Fitness, the Board 
of Law Examiners, or the staff of the Supreme Court shall be guilty of contempt of the Supreme 
Court and may be punished accordingly.  For the purpose of this rule, false or misleading 
information shall include the knowing omission of material information by an applicant in the 
application (to include any attachments to the application) or in response to an inquiry by the 
Committee on Character and Fitness, the Board of Law Examiners or staff of the Supreme Court.  
Any allegation that an applicant has violated this section shall be investigated by the Committee 
on Character and Fitness using the procedures in sections (g) and (l)(5) of this rule.  If it is 
determined that the applicant has violated this section, the Supreme Court may take such action 
as it deems appropriate.  This may include, but is not limited to, finding the applicant in 
contempt, finding the applicant unfit for admission, prohibiting the applicant from using the 
results of the examination for admission, and/or preventing the applicant from reapplying for 
admission for up to five (5) years.  Further, if the applicant has already been admitted, the 
Supreme Court may vacate the admission or discipline the lawyer under Rule 413 of the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules. 
 
(f)  Administration of the UBE in South Carolina. 
(1)  When Given.  The UBE shall be administered twice each year on the last 
consecutive Tuesday and Wednesday in February and July.  The MPT and MEE will be 
given on Tuesday, and the MBE will be given on Wednesday. 
(2) Anonymous Grading; Prohibited Comments in Answer Sheets and Booklets.  
Applicants taking the UBE in South Carolina shall be assigned an identification number 
that shall be used for the purposes of taking and grading the examination.  Except for the 
identification number and any other information the applicant may be directed to provide 
by those administering the examination, answer sheets or booklets for the examination 
shall contain no other information revealing the identity of the applicant.  Any reference 
to the applicant's economic status, social standing, employment, personal hardship, or 
other extraneous information in the answer sheets or booklets is prohibited. 
 
                                                 
  
6 The Rules of the Board of Law Examiners are available at 
www.sccourts.org/courtReg/Part4AppendixA.html
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(3) Notification of Results.  For applicants who take the UBE in South Carolina, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall notify each applicant of the score received on the UBE 
and on the MBE.  Additionally, the names of those receiving a score of 266 or higher on 
the UBE, and the identification numbers of those receiving a score of less than 266 on the 
UBE shall be posted on the Bar Admissions page of the South Carolina Judicial 
Department Website. 
(4) Access to Examination Answers; Re-grading or Other Review.  No applicant 
shall be given access to the answers the applicant submitted during a UBE taken in South 
Carolina. The results reported for the examination are final, and no applicant shall be 
allowed to seek re-grading or any other review of the results of the examination. 
(5) Request for Verification of Multistate Bar Examination.  While no review or 
inspection of the MBE will be permitted, an applicant who took the UBE in South 
Carolina may request a hand grading of the MBE.  Any such request must be filed with 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court, along with the applicable fee, within fifteen (15) days of 
the date of the notification in (3) above.7   
(6) Prohibited Contacts.  An applicant shall not, either directly or through an agent, 
contact any member of the Board of Law Examiners or any member of the Supreme 
Court regarding the questions on any section of the examination, grading procedures, or 
an applicant's answers.  This provision does not prohibit an applicant from seeking 
verification of the MBE score as permitted by (5) above. 
(7) Cheating and Other Prohibited Acts.  An applicant taking the UBE in South 
Carolina shall not: 
(i) cheat or attempt to cheat on the UBE in South Carolina; 
(ii) assist or attempt to assist another in cheating on the UBE in this or any 
other jurisdiction; 
(iii) possess an item on the premises of the examination site or in the 
examination room if the possession of that item is prohibited by the Board of Law 
Examiners; or 
(iv) remove or attempt to remove any testing material from the examination 
room or site. 
Any allegation that an applicant has violated this section shall be investigated by the 
Committee on Character and Fitness using the procedures in sections (g) and (l)(5) of this 
rule. If it is determined that the applicant has violated this section, the Supreme Court 
 
                                                 
  7 The fee is currently fifty dollars ($50) and must be paid by check or money order made 
payable to the National Conference of Bar Examiners. 
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may take such action as it deems appropriate.  This may include, but is not limited to, 
finding the applicant unfit for admission, prohibiting the applicant from using the results 
of the examination for admission, and/or preventing the applicant from reapplying for 
admission for up to five (5) years.  Further, if the applicant has already been admitted, the 
Supreme Court may vacate the admission or discipline the lawyer under Rule 413 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  Finally, an applicant committing one of these 
prohibited acts shall be guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court and may be punished 
accordingly.  
(g) Determination of Character and Fitness for Admission. 
 
(1) Determination by Committee on Character and Fitness.  The Committee on 
Character and Fitness shall consider the application and any further information it deems 
relevant to determine if the applicant has the requisite qualifications and character to be 
admitted to practice law in this state.  The Committee shall notify the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court whether it finds the applicant qualified or unqualified and, if found to be 
unqualified, the Clerk shall notify the applicant of this finding.  An applicant found to be 
unqualified shall not be allowed to sit for the UBE in South Carolina.  If the Committee 
has not made a determination of the applicant's qualification by July 1st for the July 
examination or February 1st for the February examination, the applicant shall be allowed 
to sit for the examination, and the Committee shall make its determination after the 
examination is administered. 
(2)  Determination of Fitness of Certain Law Students.  A student enrolled in an 
ABA Approved Law School who has a character problem that might disqualify the 
student from being admitted to practice law may have the matter resolved by filing a 
provisional application. The application shall be made on a form approved by the 
Committee on Character and Fitness and shall be filed in duplicate with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court.  Each request must be accompanied by a non-refundable fee of $100.  
The Committee on Character and Fitness may begin an immediate investigation of the 
individual's character and shall promptly notify the individual of its determination.  No 
adverse inference concerning an applicant's character and fitness shall be drawn because 
the applicant filed a provisional application, nor does the filing of a provisional 
application relieve an applicant from fully complying with the normal application 
process. 
(3) Review by Supreme Court of Fitness Determination; Re-application.  Any 
applicant dissatisfied with the determination of the Committee on Character and Fitness 
may petition the Supreme Court for review within fifteen (15) days of the date of the 
notification advising the applicant of the Committee's determination.  The petition shall 
comply with the requirements of Rule 240 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, 
to include the filing fee required by that rule.  An applicant who is found not to be 
qualified by the Committee or whose petition for review of the Committee's 
 
34 

 
determination has been denied may not reapply for admission until two (2) years after the 
date of the notification advising the applicant of the Committee's determination. 
(h) Admission.  
(1) Admission Ceremonies.  Admission ceremonies shall be conducted by the 
Supreme Court in February, May, September, and November.  Applicants must have 
submitted proof of completion of all requirements for admission (see section (c) of this 
rule) at least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled date of the ceremony to participate in 
that ceremony.  Applicants who take the February UBE in South Carolina are expected to 
have all requirements for admission completed for the May ceremony following the 
examination, and applicants who take the July UBE in South Carolina are expected to 
have all requirements for admission completed for the November ceremony following the 
examination.  Applicants will be notified of the date and time of the admission ceremony. 
(2) Special Admission Ceremonies.  On petition, the Supreme Court may schedule 
applicants for admission on other dates based on compelling circumstances such as 
illness or irreconcilable conflicts that prevent the applicant from appearing at one of the 
ceremonies established in (1) above.  Applicants who are ineligible to participate in one 
of the admission ceremonies established in (1) above due to their failure to timely submit 
proof of completion of the MPRE or the Course of Study on South Carolina Law are not 
eligible to be admitted at a special admission ceremony. 
(3) Fee and Oath.   To be admitted, the applicant must pay a fee of $50 and take and 
subscribe the following oath or affirmation: 
Lawyer's Oath 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that: 
I am duly qualified, according to the Constitution of this State, to exercise the 
duties of the office to which I have been appointed, and that I will, to the best of 
my ability, discharge those duties and will preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution of this State and of the United States; 
I will maintain the respect and courtesy due to courts of justice, judicial officers, 
and those who assist them; 
To my clients, I pledge faithfulness, competence, diligence, good judgment, and 
prompt communication; 
To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not 
only in court, but also in all written and oral communications; 
I will not pursue or maintain any suit or proceeding which appears to me to be 
 
unjust nor maintain any defenses except those I believe to be honestly debatable 
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under the law of the land, but this obligation shall not prevent me from defending 
a person charged with a crime; 
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me only such 
means as are consistent with trust and honor and the principles of professionalism, 
and will never seek to mislead an opposing party, the judge, or jury by a false 
statement of fact or law; 
I will respect and preserve inviolate the confidences of my clients, and will accept 
no compensation in connection with a client's business except from the client or 
with the client's knowledge and approval; 
I will maintain the dignity of the legal system and advance no fact prejudicial to 
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the 
cause with which I am charged; 
I will assist the defenseless or oppressed by ensuring that justice is available to all 
citizens and will not delay any person's cause for profit or malice; 
[So help me God.] 
The oath or affirmation shall be administered in open Court, and all persons admitted 
shall sign their names in a book, kept for that purpose, in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court.  
(i) Failure to be Admitted.     
(1) Applicants Seeking Admission Based on An Existing UBE Score.  If an 
applicant seeking admission based on an existing UBE score (as defined in section (b) of 
this rule) is not admitted within one (1) year of the date of the filing of the application, 
the applicant must file a supplemental application with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.  
The supplemental application shall be on a form prescribed by the Committee on 
Character and Fitness, and the applicant may not be admitted to the South Carolina Bar 
unless the Committee on Character and Fitness makes a re-determination that the 
applicant is qualified.  The filing shall be accompanied by a fee of $250.  Further, the 
application for admission (along with the supplemental application) shall be treated as 
being withdrawn if the applicant fails to be admitted within two (2) years of the date of 
the filing of the application. 
(2) Applicants Taking the UBE in South Carolina. If an applicant taking the UBE 
in South Carolina is not admitted within one (1) year of the date of the notification 
advising the applicant that the applicant has received a qualifying score on the UBE for 
admission, the applicant must file a supplemental application with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court.  The supplemental application shall be on a form prescribed by the 
Committee on Character and Fitness, and the applicant may not be admitted to the South 
Carolina Bar unless the Committee on Character and Fitness makes a re-determination 
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that the applicant is qualified.  The filing shall be accompanied by a fee of $250.  Further, 
the application for admission (along with the supplemental application) shall be treated as 
being withdrawn if the applicant fails to be admitted within two (2) years of the date of 
the notification advising the applicant that the applicant has received a qualifying score 
on the UBE for admission.   
(j)  Admission of Certain Law Professors.  A person serving as the Dean or as a tenured 
professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law or the Charleston School of Law 
may be admitted to practice law in this State without complying with the requirements of 
sections (c)(5) (qualifying UBE score), (c)(6) (qualifying MPRE scaled score), and (c)(8) 
(successful completion of Course of Study on South Carolina Law) of this rule if the Dean or 
professor: 
(1) has been admitted to practice law in the highest court of another state or the 
District of Columbia for at least five (5) years; 
(2) has been a full-time and continuous member of the faculty of the law school with 
the rank of assistant professor of law or higher for the previous three (3) or more 
complete academic years; and  
(3) has been recommended for admission by the Dean of the law school, or in the 
case of the Dean, by the President of the University of South Carolina or the Chairman of 
the Board of Directors of the Charleston School of Law. 
The application for admission shall be made on a form prescribed by the Committee on 
Character and Fitness, and shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.  The 
application shall be accompanied by a non-refundable application fee of $1,000.  The 
Dean or professor must comply with all other requirements of section (c) of this rule.  If 
found qualified by the Committee on Character and Fitness, the Dean or professor shall 
be admitted upon taking the oath and paying the fee specified by section (h) of this rule. 
(k) Board of Law Examiners.  
(1) Members. The Board of Law Examiners shall consist of members of the South 
Carolina Bar who are actively engaged in the practice of law in South Carolina and who 
have been members of the South Carolina Bar for at least seven (7) years.  Members of 
the bar who are inactive members, judicial members, military members, administrative 
law judge or workers' compensation commission members, retired members, or limited 
members shall not be appointed to the Board. The Board members shall be appointed by 
the Supreme Court for three (3) year terms and shall be eligible for reappointment.  At 
least one member shall be appointed from each Congressional District.  In case of a 
vacancy on the Board, the Supreme Court shall appoint a member of the South Carolina 
Bar to serve the remainder of the unexpired term. 
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(2) Chair; Secretary. The Supreme Court shall appoint a chair from among the 
members of the Board of Law Examiners.  The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve as 
secretary of the Board ex officio. 
(3) Duties. The Board of Law Examiners shall conduct the UBE in South Carolina.  
The Board shall be responsible for grading the MPT and the MEE portions of the 
examination.  The Board shall develop a Course of Study on South Carolina Law that an 
applicant must successfully complete prior to being admitted under this rule.  The content 
and method of delivery of this Course of Study shall be determined by the Board.  The 
Board may promulgate rules and regulations including those relating to the 
accommodation of applicants with disabilities.  These rules and regulations shall not 
become effective until at least ninety (90) days after they are approved by the Supreme 
Court. 
(l) Committee on Character and Fitness.
(1) Members. The Committee on Character and Fitness shall consist of twelve (12) 
members of the South Carolina Bar who shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for five 
(5) year terms.  Members of the bar who are inactive members, judicial members, 
military members, administrative law judge or workers' compensation commission 
members, retired members, or limited members shall not be appointed to the Committee.  
In case of a vacancy on the Committee, the Supreme Court shall appoint a member of the 
South Carolina Bar to serve the remainder of the unexpired term.  
(2) Chair; Secretary.  The Supreme Court shall appoint a chair and a secretary from
among the members of the Committee on Character and Fitness.
(3) Panels and Meetings. The members shall be divided by the chair into panels 
composed of three (3) members.  The chair may rotate membership on the panels, and 
may substitute members between panels. Panels shall meet when scheduled by the chair 
or the Committee, and the full Committee may meet to consider administrative matters.  
Meetings of the Committee other than periodic meetings may be called by the chair upon 
the chair's own motion and shall be called by the chair upon the written request of three 
members of the Committee. 
(4) Quorum. A quorum for a meeting of the full Committee shall be seven (7) 
members, and a quorum for a panel shall be three (3) members.
(5) Duties.  The Committee on Character and Fitness shall investigate and determine 
whether an applicant for admission possesses the qualifications prescribed by this rule as 
to age, legal education, and character. The applicant must establish to the reasonable 
satisfaction of a majority of a panel that the applicant is qualified.  In conducting 
investigations, a panel may take and hear testimony, compel by subpoena the attendance 
of witnesses, and require the applicant to appear for a hearing before a panel or for a 
personal interview before a single member of the Committee.  An applicant will not be
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denied admission by the Committee without being afforded the opportunity for a hearing 
before a panel.  Any member of the Committee may administer oaths and issue 
subpoenas. The Committee may adopt rules that shall become effective upon approval 
by the Supreme Court.  In addition, the Committee shall perform the duties specified by 
Rule 33 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413 of the 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and any other duties as directed by the Supreme 
Court. 
(m) Confidentiality and Release of Information.  
(1) The files and records maintained by the Board of Law Examiners, the Committee 
on Character and Fitness, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court relating to applications for 
admission, examinations, and admissions shall be confidential, and shall not be disclosed 
except as necessary for the Board, the Committee, or the Clerk of the Supreme Court to 
carry out their responsibilities. The Board of Law Examiners, the Committee on 
Character and Fitness, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court may disclose information to 
the National Conference of Bar Examiners and to the bar admission authorities in other 
jurisdictions, and may disclose the names of those persons who have received a score of 
266 or higher on a UBE administered in South Carolina, or those who are or will be 
admitted and the date of their admission.  Information may be released as provided by 
Rule 410(f) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  The Supreme Court may 
authorize the release of confidential information to other persons or agencies. 
(2) Beginning with the results of the February 2017 examination, the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court may release the following information to a law school regarding a 
graduate of that law school who has taken the UBE in South Carolina: the name of the 
graduate, the UBE and scaled MBE scores the graduate received, and the number of 
times the graduate has taken a bar examination in South Carolina.  Any information 
released to law schools pursuant to this rule shall be kept confidential by the law school, 
shall only be used for statistical analysis, and shall only be released for purposes of 
reporting aggregated information to accrediting bodies.  Each law school requesting the 
release of the above information shall, on a form approved by the Supreme Court, agree 
to comply with the confidentiality and use restrictions placed on this information 
(n) Immunity. 
(1) The Board of Law Examiners, the Committee on Character and Fitness, and the 
members, employees, and agents of the Board of Law Examiners or the Committee of 
Character and Fitness, are absolutely immune from all civil liability for conduct and 
communications occurring in the performance of their official duties relating to the 
examination, character and fitness qualification, and licensing of persons seeking to be 
admitted, readmitted, or reinstated to the practice of law. 
(2) Records, statements of opinion, testimony and other information regarding an 
applicant for admission, readmission or reinstatement to the Bar communicated by any 
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entity, including any person, firm, or institution, to the Board of Law Examiners, the 
Committee on Character and Fitness, or to the members, employees or agents of the 
Board of Law Examiners or Committee on Character and Fitness, are absolutely 
privileged, and civil suits predicated thereon may not be instituted. 
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GEATHERS, J.: In this declaratory judgment action, Appellants, Vivian Atkins,
Robert Frick, and Kay Hollis, a majority of the members of Chapin Town Council, 
seek review of the circuit court's order granting the motion of Respondents, Mayor 
James Wilson, Jr. and Councilman Gregg White, to invalidate actions taken by 
Appellants at two special Council meetings. Appellants also initially challenged
the circuit court's order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and 
dismissing their complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure (SCRCP). However, at oral arguments, Appellants advised the
court they wished to waive their assignments of error as to this particular order.  
Therefore, we summarily affirm this order without further discussion. As to the 
circuit court's order invalidating the actions taken by Appellants at the two special
meetings, we reverse.     
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In November 2013, the voters of the Town of Chapin elected a new mayor, 
Respondent Wilson, and a new Council member, Respondent White. The Mayor's 
term of office began on January 7, 2014. According to Appellant Atkins, before
the Mayor was sworn in, he announced that he had hired Karen Owens to serve as 
"Director of Communication and Economic Development" although Council had 
not voted to create the position or make it a part of the Town's budget.1  The Mayor 
also (1) refused to honor a retainer agreement between the Town and an attorney 
for the Town's utility department, (2) signed a contract to hire Nicole Howland as
Town Attorney without first submitting the contract to Council for approval, (3) 
refused to place several items on the agendas for Council meetings despite requests 
from certain Council members, and (4) refused to schedule a special meeting at 
Atkins' request.   
Accordingly, on February 26, 2014, Appellants filed a complaint invoking 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-10 to -140 
(2005), seeking a judgment declaring section 2.206(b) of the Chapin Town Code
unenforceable to the extent it grants the Mayor control over the agendas for
1 At a subsequent meeting, Council voted to create the position but did not discuss 
compensation.   
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Council meetings. Section 2.206 appears in the Town Code with the catchword 
"Agenda" as follows:
2.206. AGENDA. 
a. Matters to be considered by the Mayor and 
Council at a regular meeting shall be placed on a written
agenda and publicly posted at least twenty-four (24) 
hours prior to the meeting. Matters not on the agenda 
may be considered upon request of a member unless a
majority of Council objects. 
. . . 
b. The agenda shall be approved by the Mayor,
prior to distribution. It shall be prepared under the 
supervision of the Clerk/Treasurer. 
The complaint also sought a preliminary injunction requiring the Mayor to 
"place on the agenda of the next Council meeting . . . any item requested by any 
member of Council." Appellants filed a separate motion for a preliminary
injunction seeking an order requiring the Mayor "to place any item requested by 
any member of Council on the agenda of the next occurring Council meeting after 
the request, without any delay." At the motions hearing, Appellants explained that 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) prohibited them from exercising their 
power under section 2.206(a) to amend the agenda during the meeting. See 
Lambries v. Saluda Cty. Council (Lambries I), 398 S.C. 501, 506, 728 S.E.2d 488, 
491 (Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]he purpose of FOIA is best served by prohibiting public 
bodies governed by FOIA from amending their agendas during meetings."), rev'd 
(Lambries II), 409 S.C. 1, 760 S.E.2d 785 (2014), superseded in part by 2015 Act 
No. 70.2 
2 Lambries I was issued on June 13, 2012, and Lambries II was issued on June 18, 
2014. In the present action, Appellants filed their complaint on February 26, 2014.  
The order dismissing the complaint was dated March 18, 2014, and filed the 
following day. Therefore, Lambries II did not affect the present case at the time of
the motions hearing. Further, in 2015 Act No. 70, the legislature superseded the 
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On March 18, 2014, the circuit court issued an order denying Appellants'
request for a preliminary injunction and granting Respondents' motion to dismiss.
In addressing the motion for a preliminary injunction, the circuit court stated, "the 
Mayor must sign off on the agenda prior to its distribution to Council, and there is 
no requirement that the Mayor place items on the agenda that he believes do not 
merit Council's consideration." In addressing Respondents' motion to dismiss, the 
circuit court stated, "Ordinance § 2.206(b) grants Mayor Wilson the authority and 
discretion to approve and, inherently, to deny any item requested to  be on  the  
agenda for a Council meeting."     
The circuit court addressed the complaint's assertion that if section 2.206 
grants the Mayor complete control over the agenda, this provision violates the state 
and federal constitutions. Despite Appellants' FOIA argument, the circuit court 
stated that section 2.206(a) allows matters not on the agenda to be considered upon 
request of a member unless a majority of members object. The circuit court also
stated that Council's ability to amend the agenda during the meeting acted "as a
safeguard against autocratic mayoral action that may otherwise rise to a 
constitutional depravation [sic] of basic rights." On April 8, 2014, the circuit court
denied Appellants' motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP.  
Appellants filed and served a Notice of Appeal of the circuit court's orders on April 
22, 2014. 
In the meantime, on April 5, 2014, Atkins carried to Appellant Robert 
Frick's home a prepared notice calling for a special meeting of Council on April 
10, 2014, to amend section 2.206(b) of the Chapin Town Code to require the
primary holdings of Lambries II, i.e., that FOIA does not require an agenda to be 
issued for a regularly scheduled meeting and, thus, FOIA does not prohibit public
bodies from amending an agenda for a regularly scheduled meeting.  Act No. 70,
which became effective on June 8, 2015, amended section 30-4-80(a) of the South 
Carolina Code (2007) to prohibit the amendment of a posted meeting agenda 
during the meeting without a finding of exigent circumstances and a two-thirds 
vote of the members present. 
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Mayor to place on a meeting agenda any item requested by a member of Council.3 
Atkins discussed the notice with Frick, who agreed to call for a special meeting 
and signed the notice. On April 6, 2014, Atkins took the notice to Appellant Kay
Hollis's home and discussed the notice with her. Hollis also agreed to calling a 
special meeting and signed the notice. 
On April 7, 2014, Atkins took the notice to the Town Clerk and asked her to 
post the notice at Town Hall and on the Town's website and to notify the news 
media.4 On this same day, Respondents filed a "Motion to Enforce Order and to 
Enjoin Contrary Conduct" with the circuit court. In this motion, Respondents 
complained that Appellants noticed the special meeting with an agenda that was 
never presented to the Mayor for his approval and alleged that Appellants were 
"disregarding the [circuit court's] March 18th Order with respect to the Mayor's
authority to approve or reject agenda items under Ordinance § 2.206(b)."
Respondents sought "an order enforcing the [circuit court's] prior ruling and 
enjoining [Appellants] from taking any action contrary to that ruling, including 
going forward with the improperly-noticed [special] meeting." On April 8, 2014, 
the circuit court's presiding judge sent a letter to the parties advising them of his 
availability for a hearing and stating his opinion that any actions taken by 
Appellants "in contravention of the [circuit court's] March 18, 2014 
Order . . . could be illegal and of no force and effect."   
Neither the Mayor nor White attended the April 10 and 17, 2014 special
meetings. Therefore, Atkins presided over these meetings in her capacity as
Mayor pro tempore.  At  the  April  10 meeting, a first reading  was given to the 
proposed amendment to section 2.206(b).5 Additional business was conducted at 
3 Section 2.202(3) of the Chapin Town Code gives a majority of Council members 
the authority to call special meetings. Section 2.202 states, "Special meetings may
be held: 1. whenever called by the Mayor in cases of emergency, or; 2.  when, in
the judgment of the Mayor, the good of the municipality requires  it, or; 3.  by  a  
majority of the members of Council." 
4 Atkins repeated the same procedure for another special meeting conducted on 
April 17, 2014.
5 Counsel for Appellants later discovered a scrivener's error in the amendment that 
referenced "called" meetings. 
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this meeting, although the record does not indicate the subject of this additional 
business, only that it was included in the published agenda.   
On April 14, 2014, Respondents filed a "Motion for Civil Contempt," 
seeking an order "holding [Appellants] in civil contempt of court 
and . . . invalidating any actions that [Appellants] purportedly took at any meeting 
that they attempted to convene in contravention of [the circuit court's] rulings."  
Subsequently, Council conducted a second reading of the amendment to section 
2.206(b) at the April 17 meeting. Again, additional business was conducted at the 
April 17 meeting, although the record does not indicate the subject of this 
additional business, only that it was included in the published agenda.   
On April 25, 2014, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Respondents' 
motion to enforce the March 18, 2014 order and motion for contempt. On May 5, 
2014, the circuit court issued an order denying the motion for contempt but
purporting to invalidate the actions taken at the April 10 and 17, 2014 special 
meetings on the ground that Appellants did not present agendas for these meetings 
to the Mayor for his approval. Appellants filed and served a Notice of Appeal on
May 23, 2014, and the Clerk of this court later consolidated the appeal with the 
previous appeal of the circuit court's March 18, 2014 order.   
On March 23, 2015, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on 
the ground that Appellants did not appeal the circuit court's "declarations and 
rulings as they relate to the Town of Chapin"—a defendant before the circuit 
court—and, therefore, "those rulings are the law of the case with respect to the 
Town." On May 29, 2015, then Chief Judge Few issued an order stating, in 
pertinent part, 
Respondents have not convinced this court that the 
omission of the Town as a Respondent affects this appeal 
other than on a substantive basis as to the merits. 
Because Respondents seek dismissal on a substantive 
basis, which is inappropriate at this stage of the appeal, 
the motion is denied. This court will consider the merits 
of this appeal once briefing is complete and the appeal 
has been assigned to a panel. 
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(emphases added). Notably, Respondents did not amend their appellate brief to list 
this issue as an additional sustaining ground or to otherwise argue this issue. We 
address the motion to dismiss the appeal, which we deny, at the end of this 
opinion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Declaratory judgments in and of themselves are neither legal nor equitable.  
The standard of review for a declaratory judgment action is therefore determined 
by the nature of the underlying issue." Kinard v. Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 256,
754 S.E.2d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted) (quoting Campbell v.
Marion Cty. Hosp. Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 279, 580 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. App. 
2003))).6 Here, Respondents were seeking, and were granted, an invalidation of 
6 We note Respondents did not correctly invoke the circuit court's authority to rule 
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (the Act). While the circuit court's 
March 18, 2014 order merely granted Respondents' motion to dismiss Appellants' 
declaratory judgment action, Respondents' memorandum supporting their motions 
emphasized the order's statement that the Mayor must sign off on the agenda prior 
to its distribution to Council and characterized that statement as a "declaration."
The circuit court then stated in its May 5, 2014 order that it had previously
"declared" that agendas for Council meetings had to be approved by the Mayor 
prior to the agenda's distribution. Again, we emphasize the circuit court's March
18 order dismissed the declaratory judgment action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for dismissal of a case 
for "failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." Therefore, the 
circuit court incorrectly invoked section 15-53-120 of the South Carolina Code 
(2005), which states that further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be 
granted whenever necessary or proper, in support of its "declaratory ruling."   
In any event, we construe Respondents' motion to enforce the March 18
order as a new action seeking declaratory relief under the Act, specifically section 
15-53-30 of the South Carolina Code (2005), which allows any person "whose 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by" a municipal ordinance to have 
determined "any question of construction" arising under the ordinance and "obtain 
a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 15-53-130 (2005) (requiring courts to construe and administer the 
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Appellants' actions at the two special meetings; such a remedy can be characterized 
as injunctive relief. See Bus. License Opposition Comm. v. Sumter Cty., 311 S.C. 
24, 27-28, 426 S.E.2d 745, 747-48 (1992) (noting FOIA authorizes injunctive 
relief and characterizing invalidation of an ordinance as injunctive relief). "An 
order granting or denying an injunction is reviewed for [an] abuse of discretion."  
Lambries II, 409 S.C. at 7, 760 S.E.2d at 788, superseded on other grounds by
2015 Act No. 70. However, Respondents based their motion on their interpretation 
of sections 2.202 and 2.206 of the Chapin Town Code. Because this is a question 
of law, this court need not give deference to the circuit court's interpretation of the 
disputed provision. Cf. id. at 8, 760 S.E.2d at 788 ("[W]hile an injunction is
equitable and subject to the trial court's discretion, where the decision turns on 
statutory interpretation[,] . . . this presents a question of law.  As  a  result, [the  
appellate court] need not give deference to the trial court's interpretation. If, based 
on this [c]ourt's assessment, the trial court committed an error of law in its 
interpretation of [a statute], that would constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court."). 
LAW/ANALYSIS
Appellants contend the circuit court erred in invalidating the actions taken 
by Council at the April 10 and 17, 2014 special meetings, arguing the requirement
of section 2.206(b) of the Chapin Town Code that the Mayor approve meeting 
agendas does not apply to section 2.202 governing special meetings.  We agree. 
"The primary consideration in legislative construction is to ascertain the 
intent of the legislative body enacting the legislation." Fairfield Ocean Ridge, Inc. 
v. Town of Edisto Beach, 294 S.C. 475, 481, 366 S.E.2d 15, 19 (Ct. App. 1988), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as indicated in Heilker v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals for City of Beaufort, 346 S.C. 401, 406, 552 S.E.2d 42, 45 (Ct. App. 
provisions of the Act liberally). We also interpret the circuit court's May 5, 2014 
order as an original declaratory judgment issued under the authority of section 15-
53-20 of the South Carolina Code (2005), which gives courts of record the power 
to "declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed" and confers on such declarations "the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree." 
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2001). "[W]hen interpreting an ordinance, legislative intent must prevail if it can 
be reasonably discovered in the language used." Charleston Cty. Parks & 
Recreation Comm'n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995). The 
plain language of section 2.206 indicates it applies only to regular meetings.  
Respondents' argument to the contrary is based on the premise that subsection (b) 
of section 2.206 is an ordinance unto itself, stands alone, and should be read in 
isolation.7 We reject this premise. See Singletary v. S.C. Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 
153, 162, 447 S.E.2d 231, 236 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The intention of the legislature 
must be gleaned from the entire section and not simply clauses taken out of 
context."). 
As previously stated, section 2.206, in its entirety, appears in the Town Code 
with the catchword "Agenda" as follows: 
2.206. AGENDA. 
a. Matters to be considered by the Mayor and 
Council at a regular meeting shall be placed on a written
agenda and publicly posted at least twenty-four (24) 
hours prior to the meeting. Matters not on the agenda
may be considered upon request of a member unless a
majority of Council objects. 
. . . 
b. The agenda shall be approved by the Mayor, 
prior to distribution. It shall be prepared under the 
supervision of the Clerk/Treasurer.     
7 Specifically, Respondents assert, "the Town of Chapin has a single ordinance 
governing how agendas for Council meetings must be established:  Ordinance §  
2.206(b). This ordinance provides that '[t]he agenda shall be approved by the
Mayor, prior to distribution' to Councilmembers and to the public.  Chapin, S.C.,  
Code. § 2.206(b)." Respondents also assert, "Because it is the sole ordinance that 
discusses meeting agendas, it is no surprise that Section 2.206(b) does not 
distinguish how agendas should be prepared based on the type of meeting being 
held." 
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(emphases added). Like the second sentence of subsection (a), subsection (b) 
employs the article "the" immediately before "agenda," rather than referencing "an 
agenda," "a written agenda," or "a meeting agenda." This implies that subsection 
(b), like the second sentence of subsection (a), is referring back to previous 
language, i.e., the language in the first sentence of subsection (a). This sentence 
specifically references agendas for regular meetings only: "Matters to be 
considered by the Mayor and Council at a regular meeting shall be placed on a
written agenda . . . ." See State v. Leopard, 349 S.C. 467, 472-73, 563 S.E.2d 342, 
345 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The canon of construction 'expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius' or 'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius' holds that 'to express or include one
thing implies the exclusion of another, or of the alternative.'" (quoting S.C. Dep't of 
Consumer Affairs v. Rent–A–Center, Inc., 345 S.C. 251, 256, 547 S.E.2d 881, 883-
84 (Ct. App. 2001)).   
Therefore, the general reference to "[t]he agenda" in subsection (b) invokes 
a written agenda that includes only those "[m]atters to be considered by the Mayor 
and Council at a regular meeting," as limited by the specific language in subsection 
(a). See Singletary, 316 S.C. at 161, 447 S.E.2d at 235 ("When the legislature uses
words of particular and specific meaning followed by general words, the general 
words are construed to embrace only persons or things of the same general kind or 
class as those enumerated."); see also State v. Johnson, 396 S.C. 182, 188, 720 
S.E.2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In interpreting a statute, the court will give 
words their plain and ordinary meaning, and will not resort to forced construction 
that would limit or expand the statute."). 
It is logical that the plain language of section 2.206 limits its applicability to 
regular meetings rather than purporting to control special meeting agendas 
because, as we explain below, the very nature of a special meeting inherently 
controls the content of that meeting's agenda. The provisions governing special 
meetings are section 5-7-250(a) of the South Carolina Code (2004) and section 
2.202 of the Chapin Town Code. Section 2.202 states in full, "Special meetings
may be held: 1. whenever called by the Mayor in cases of emergency, or; 2.
when, in the judgment of the Mayor, the good of the municipality requires it, or; 3.  
by a majority of the members of Council." (emphasis added). Section 5-7-250(a) 
also grants a majority of Council members the power to call a special meeting:  
"The council, after public notice[,] shall meet regularly at least once in every
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month at such times and places as the council may prescribe by rule. Special 
meetings may be held on the call of the mayor or of a majority of the members." 
(emphases added).   
Our supreme court has described a special meeting as a meeting "called for 
a special purpose and at which nothing can be done beyond the objects specified 
for the call." Brock v. Town of Mount Pleasant, Op. No. 27621 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed 
April 13, 2016) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 15 at 21, 25) (emphases added) (quoting 
Lambries II, 409 S.C. at 15, 760 S.E.2d at 792)). In other words, the actions of a
public body at a special meeting "may not exceed the scope of the purpose for 
which the meeting was called." Id. at 26 (emphasis added). This means that those
who lawfully call the special meeting have a purpose for the meeting, and this
purpose is the only item on which action may be taken.8 Brock at 25, 26.  
Accordingly, this purpose, which is generated by the person or persons calling the 
special meeting, will be the sole item listed in the meeting's written agenda. Brock
at 25, 26.9 Therefore, a requirement that the Mayor approve this written agenda
would be incompatible with the very nature of a special meeting called by a
majority of Council members.10 
Taking Respondents' argument to its logical conclusion would render the 
provisions granting Appellants authority to call a special meeting a nullity. If the
Mayor can disapprove an agenda for a special meeting called by a majority of 
Council members—an agenda that must be limited to the purpose for calling the 
special meeting—the special meeting will be left without a reason to proceed, 
effectively stripping the majority of its authority to call the meeting. We decline to 
infer such an intent on the part of Council when it adopted the Chapin Town 
8 Of course, to the extent there is more than one purpose, action may be taken on 
these purposes.
9 Further, this written agenda must be included in the public notice of the special 
meeting. Lambries II, 409 S.C. at 13-14, 760 S.E.2d at 791 (emphasizing FOIA's
requirement that public notice for a special meeting must include the meeting's 
agenda).
10 It would be unnecessary for the Mayor to approve the agenda for a special 
meeting called by the Mayor himself. 
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Code.11 See Somers, 319 S.C. at 67, 459 S.E.2d at 843 ("[W]hen interpreting an 
ordinance, legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the 
language used."); id. at 68, 459 S.E.2d at 843 ("An ordinance must receive a
practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, 
and policy of the lawmakers."); id. ("In construing ordinances, the terms used must 
be taken in their ordinary and popular meaning."); Johnson, 396 S.C. at 188, 720 
S.E.2d at 520 ("In interpreting a statute, the court will give words their plain and 
ordinary meaning, and will not resort to forced construction that would limit or 
expand the statute."). 
Likewise, we decline to infer such an intent on the part of the legislature 
when it enacted section 5-7-250(a). See State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 
S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) ("All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the 
one that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the 
language used, and that language must be construed in light of the intended 
purpose of the statute." (quoting Broadhurst v. City of Myrtle Beach Election 
Comm'n, 342 S.C. 373, 380, 537 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000))); id. ("A statute as a 
whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with 
the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers." (quoting Browning v. 
Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 125, 414 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992))); id. at 351, 688 
S.E.2d at 575 ("Courts will reject a statutory interpretation which would lead to a 
result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the [l]egislature or 
11 Respondents also argue the catchword "Agenda" indicates the provisions of 
section 2.206 apply to agendas for all types of meetings.  In support of this 
argument, Respondents cite Beaufort Cty. v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 395 S.C. 
366, 373, 718 S.E.2d 432, 436 (2011), for the proposition that an appellate court 
may consider the title or caption of legislation in determining legislative intent.  
Respondents' reliance on Beaufort is misplaced. Chapin's Town Code itself 
governs this particular aspect of legislative interpretation.  Section 1.204 of the 
Town Code states, in pertinent part, "The catchlines of the several sections of this 
code printed in capital letters, a different type or underlined are intended as mere 
catchwords to indicate or emphasize the contents of such sections, not as any part 
of the section . . . ." (emphasis added).  Therefore, while the catchword "Agenda" 
indicates that section 2.206 discusses meeting agendas, it cannot supplant the plain 
language of the section itself that specifically limits the ordinance to regular 
meetings.
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would defeat the plain legislative intention."); State v. Long, 363 S.C. 360, 364,
610 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2005) ("The legislature is presumed to intend that its statutes 
accomplish something."); Johnson, 396 S.C. at 188, 720 S.E.2d at 520 ("In 
interpreting a statute, the court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning, 
and will not resort to forced construction that would limit or expand the statute.").      
Based on the foregoing, Appellants acted within their authority under section 
5-7-250(a) and section 2.202(3) of the Chapin Town Code when they called the 
two special meetings and published meeting agendas limited to the meetings'
purposes without first presenting the agendas to the Mayor. The circuit court's 
invalidation of Council's actions at these two meetings on the ground that the 
agendas were not approved by the Mayor was based on an error of law and, thus,
constituted an abuse of discretion.   
Motion to Dismiss 
In their motion to dismiss this appeal, Respondents argue the law-of-the-case 
doctrine renders the circuit court's rulings conclusive as to the Town due to 
Appellants' failure to designate the Town as a respondent on appeal. Respondents 
also argue the judgments below  apply equally to all defendants and, therefore, 
Appellants "cannot seek an inconsistent decision from this Court."   
"Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a party is precluded from relitigating,
after an appeal, matters that were either not raised on appeal, but should have been,
or raised on appeal, but expressly rejected by the appellate court." Judy v. Martin, 
381 S.C. 455, 458, 674 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009). In other words, "[t]he doctrine of 
the law of the case prohibits issues [that] have been decided in a prior appeal from 
being relitigated in the trial court in the same case." Ross v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 
328 S.C. 51, 62, 492 S.E.2d 62, 68 (1997). While the doctrine has been referenced
as discretionary,12 it is recognized that principles "of authority . . . do inhere in the
12 See State v. Hewins, 409 S.C. 93, 113 n.5, 760 S.E.2d 814, 824 n.5 (2014) 
(referring to the law-of-the-case doctrine as a "discretionary appellate doctrine with 
no preclusive effect on successive trial proceedings"); S. Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 
316, 319 (1922) ("The prior ruling may have been followed as the law of the case, 
but there is a difference between such adherence and res adjudicata. One directs 
discretion: the other supersedes it and compels judgment. In other words, in one it 
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'mandate rule' that binds a lower court on remand to the law of the case established 
on appeal." 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. 2002). 
Given all of the surrounding circumstances under which Respondents ask us 
to apply the law-of-the-case doctrine, we conclude such an application is 
inappropriate. While no attorney claims to represent the Town in this appeal, all 
five Council members, which include the Mayor, are parties to this appeal, and 
Appellants represent a majority of Council members. We note that before 
Appellants filed this litigation, the Mayor refused to add to a meeting agenda the 
topic of appointing an interim town attorney despite Atkins' request. Further, after 
this litigation was filed, counsel for the Mayor purported to represent the Town as 
well.  Now, in claiming the Town has not been served with the Notice of Appeal, 
Respondents do not indicate the attorney or other individual(s) to whom Appellants 
should have sent the Notice of Appeal to effect service on the Town. They base 
their argument that Appellants failed to serve the Town on merely the failure to  
designate the Town as a respondent in the case caption and in the text of the Proof 
of Service. 
Based on all of these circumstances, we conclude Appellants have properly 
perfected their appeal of the circuit court's orders as to all parties in this case,
including the Town. To hold otherwise would place form over substance when 
doing so would not further the interests of justice.     
is a question of power, in the other of submission."); Slowinski v. Valley Nat'l 
Bank, 624 A.2d 85, 89 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1993) ("'Law of the 
case' . . . operates as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law."); 18B
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. 2002) ("So long as the same case remains alive, there is
power to alter or revoke earlier rulings."); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 991 (2007)
("The doctrine is discretionary rather than mandatory. Nonetheless, it should be 
disregarded only upon a showing of good cause for failure timely to request
reconsideration of the original appellate decision, and only as a matter  of grace  
rather than right." (footnotes omitted)). 
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal and affirm the 
circuit court's March 18, 2014 order denying Appellants' motion for a preliminary
injunction and dismissing their complaint. We reverse the circuit court's May 5, 
2014 order invalidating Council's actions at the April 10 and 17, 2014 special 
meetings. 
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART. 
SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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SHORT, J.:  In this defamation case, Gary Harris appeals the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Tietex International, Ltd. (Tietex), arguing the trial 
court erred in finding summary judgment was appropriate based on (1) a lack of 
genuine issue of material fact, (2) the statute of limitations, (3) res judicata, and (4) 
collateral estoppel. We affirm. 
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FACTS 
In 1994, Tietex hired Harris as a senior research chemist.  In 2006, Harris began to 
complain of having difficulty breathing and experiencing flu-like symptoms and 
headaches. Harris believed his health problems were being caused by mold present 
near his work area in Tietex's laboratory.  Tietex had the laboratory tested; 
however, no mold was detected.  A series of emails between Harris and his 
supervisor, Wade Wallace, indicate they discussed relocating Harris from the lab 
and allowing Harris to work in another area to protect him from the environment.  
Wallace explained to Harris that Tietex did not want to take any chances with his 
health and instructed Harris not to enter the lab under any circumstances. 
On February 9, 2007, Wallace sent an email to his supervisor, Mark Isbell, and 
Human Resources Manager David Wilson, summarizing a conversation he 
allegedly had with Harris two days earlier.  In the email, Wallace explained that 
Harris had expressed he was overwhelmed with personal problems and was 
"confused, disoriented, and could not function."  However, according to Wallace, 
Harris eventually stated he could work through his problems and thanked Wallace 
for his support and patience. 
On March 5, 2007, Wallace met with Harris to discuss several issues Harris needed 
to correct regarding his work performance.  Following their meeting, Wallace sent 
a memo to Wilson, Isbell, and Harris, outlining the issues he and Harris discussed.  
On June 18, 2007, Wallace sent another memo to Wilson, Harris, and Isbell 
regarding Harris's work on two projects.  Wallace explained Harris initiated the 
first project by convincing management he could develop a chemical compound 
that would result in cost savings for Tietex.  However, according to Wallace, 
Harris had made no significant progress after working on the project for six 
months.  Wallace claimed Harris "exercised poor judgement by making claims and 
commitments that he could not deliver."  Wallace also criticized Harris's work on 
the second project, claiming Harris failed to conduct adequate scientific analysis.  
Wallace stated Harris's "negligence" was unacceptable for a senior research 
chemist. 
On July 3, 2007, Wallace placed Harris on administrative suspension.  On July 18, 
2007, Wallace sent a final memo to Wilson and Isbell regarding Harris.  Wallace 
claimed Harris had failed to correct all but one of the issues oulined in the March 
5, 2007 memo and described several other problems he had had with Harris's work
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performance.  Wallace explained he had lost confidence in Harris's ability to 
perform his job and recommended Tietex terminate Harris's employment.  On July 
19, 2007, Tietex terminated Harris's employment. 
In August 2008, Harris filed a complaint in circuit court asserting causes of action 
against Tietex for retaliation and discrimination under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act1 (ADEA), breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by 
a fraudulent act, and defamation. Tietex removed the case to United States District 
Court.
At a deposition, Harris initially claimed the issues Wallace described in the March 
5, 2007 memo regarding Harris were false; however, when questioned about each 
issue individually, Harris did not completely dispute each point.  Harris also 
disputed some of the information contained in the June 18, 2007 memo and July 
18, 2007 memo.  Additionally, Harris characterized the portion of the June memo 
that described his work on the second project as "highly misleading as to what 
really happened." Harris admitted he had no evidence that Tietex shared these 
memos with anyone other than the individuals to whom they were addressed. 
On October 28, 2010, the district court granted summary judgment to Tietex on 
Harris's ADEA claims and dismissed Harris's state law claims, declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court's judgment on May 31, 2011.
On October 21, 2011, Harris filed his complaint against Tietex in the instant case.  
Harris later filed an amended complaint, which included a cause of action for 
defamation. Harris's amended complaint did not identify the specific statements on 
which his defamation claim was based. At a deposition, Harris identified seven 
items related to his lawsuit that he believed were defamatory: (1) the February 9, 
2007 email from Wallace to Wilson; (2) the March 5, 2007 memo; (3) the June 18, 
2007 memo; (4) the July 18, 2007 memo; (5) "rumors in the industry" that he had 
been terminated for falsifying a test report; (6) Tietex suspending Harris; and (7) 
Tietex "banning" Harris from the laboratory.  Harris admitted his defamation claim 
in the first action was not based on the February 9, 2007 email, the July 18, 2007 
memo, Tietex banning him from the laboratory, or Tietex suspending him on July 
3, 2007.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012 & Supp. II 2014).
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Tietex subsequently moved for summary judgment.  On March 20, 2014, the trial 
court granted the motion.  In its order, the trial court addressed Harris's defamation 
cause of action as seven separate claims based on the items Harris identified as 
defamatory at his deposition.2  The trial court found Tietex was entitled to 
summary judgment as to Harris's defamation claims relating to the February 9, 
2007 email and the three internal memos because these communications were 
substantially true. Furthermore, the trial court found the email and memos were 
subject to a qualified privilege because they were internal, performance-related 
communications.   
The trial court also granted summary judgment as to Harris's defamation claims 
relating to (1) "rumors in the industry" regarding Harris's termination, (2) Tietex 
suspending Harris's employment, and (3) Tietex "banning" Harris from the 
laboratory.  The trial court explained, "Given the ill-defined nature of the alleged 
defamatory statements and the lack of evidence to support these claims, Harris has 
failed to create a triable issue of fact."
Additionally, the trial court granted summary judgment to Tietex as to the 
following claims based on the claims being barred by the statute of limitations: (1) 
the February 9, 2007 email; (2) Tietex "banning" Harris from the laboratory; and 
(3) Tietex suspending Harris's employment.  The trial court explained Harris did 
not assert these claims in his first action, and therefore, the limitations period was 
not tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).  The trial court also found Harris was
precluded from asserting these claims under the doctrine of res judicata because 
they arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as Harris's claims in the first 
action. Finally, the trial court found Tietex was entitled to summary judgment on 
all of Harris's claims because he was precluded from arguing facts necessary to 
support his defamation claims under the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on 
the federal court's findings in the first action.  This appeal followed. 
2 At a hearing on the motion, Tietex addressed Harris's defamation cause of action 
as seven separate claims.  Harris, however, stated his defamation cause of action 
was based on the three internal memos.  In his brief to this court, Harris claims 
Tietex "twisted [his] deposition testimony to create 'additional' defamation claims."
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
"When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the 
same standard applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP."  Fleming 
v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c), SCRCP.  "When determining if any 
triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."  Fleming, 350 S.C. at 
493-94, 567 S.E.2d at 860. 
 
I. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
 
Harris argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine 
issues of material fact existed.  Harris contends his testimony regarding the lack of 
veracity of the memos created a genuine issue of material fact and argues that even 
if a qualified privilege applies to the communications, a jury must determine if the 
privilege was abused. We disagree. 
 
A party asserting a claim of defamation must prove the following elements: "(1) a 
false and defamatory statement was made; (2) the unprivileged publication of the 
statement to a third party; (3) the publisher was at fault; and (4) either the 
statement was actionable irrespective of harm or the publication of the statement 
caused special harm." Williams v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist., 369 S.C. 293, 302-03, 
631 S.E.2d 286, 292 (Ct. App. 2006).  "The publication of a statement is 
defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him."  Fleming, 350 S.C. at 494, 567 S.E.2d at 860. 
 
A defendant in a defamation action may assert the affirmative defense of 
conditional or qualified privilege.  Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 
ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484, 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999).  "Under this defense, one 
who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not liable for the 
publication if (1) the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it 
conditionally privileged, and (2) the privilege is not abused."  Id.  The party 
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asserting a qualified privilege must prove the following elements: (1) good faith, 
(2) an interest to be upheld, (3) a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, (4) 
a proper occasion, and (5) publication in a proper manner and to proper parties 
only. Manley v. Manley, 291 S.C. 325, 331, 353 S.E.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1987).  
Whether an occasion gives rise to a qualified or conditional privilege is generally a 
question of law for the court. Murray v. Holnam, Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 140, 542 
S.E.2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 2001). This court has previously found the qualified 
privilege applies "to situations in which an employee's job performance is properly 
evaluated." Wright v. Sparrow, 298 S.C. 469, 474, 381 S.E.2d 503, 506 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
"Where the occasion gives rise to a qualified privilege, there is a prima facie 
presumption to rebut the inference of malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to 
show actual malice or that the scope of the privilege has been exceeded."  Swinton 
Creek Nursery, 334 S.C. at 484, 514 S.E.2d at 134.  "To prove actual malice, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant was activated by ill will in what he did, with
the design to causelessly and wantonly injure the plaintiff; or that the statements 
were published with such recklessness as to show a conscious disregard for [the] 
plaintiff[']s rights." Id. at 485, 514 S.E.2d at 134. Although abuse of the 
conditional privilege is generally an issue for the jury to decide, in the absence of a 
controversy as to the facts, it is for the court to determine. Woodward v. S.C. Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co., 277 S.C. 29, 32-33, 282 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1981).  Similarly, if the 
plaintiff fails to present evidence of a genuine issue of fact as to actual malice and 
the qualified privilege is otherwise applicable, summary judgment may be granted.  
See Wright, 298 S.C. at 474, 381 S.E.2d at 507 (affirming the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment based on the qualified privilege applying to the alleged 
defamatory statements and the plaintiff failing to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact as to actual malice).   
Initially, we note Harris has not identified the specific defamatory statements on 
which he bases his defamation claim or claims.  In his brief, Harris simply asserts 
the three internal memos contained "malicious personal attacks outside any 
privilege impugning Harris's professional standards and abilities."  The memos 
contain numerous statements regarding Harris and his work performance.  Without 
Harris identifying the specific statement or statements on which he bases his claim, 
we cannot evaluate whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
truth or defamatory nature of the statements.  See McBride v. Sch. Dist. of 
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Greenville Cty., 389 S.C. 546, 562, 698 S.E.2d 845, 853 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding 
the plaintiff's description of alleged defamatory statements was too vague to be 
evaluated).   
Furthermore, we affirm the trial court's decision granting summary judgment on 
the basis of a qualified privilege applying to any statements made in the three 
internal memos.3  These communications concerned the evaluation of an 
employee's job performance; therefore, the qualified privilege applies in the 
absence of evidence of actual malice or abuse of privilege.  Harris fails to set forth 
an argument explaining what evidence he presented of actual malice or abuse of 
the qualified privilege in relation to these communications.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of the qualified 
privilege. 
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Harris also argues the trial court erred in finding his defamation cause of action 
was barred by the statute of limitations because the limitations period was tolled 
while the first action was pending in federal court.  We disagree. 
In South Carolina, defamation claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitation.  
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-550 (2005).  The limitations period begins when the alleged 
defamatory statement is made, not when the plaintiff learns of the statement.  See 
Jones v. City of Folly Beach, 326 S.C. 360, 369, 483 S.E.2d 770, 775 (Ct. App. 
1997) (affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff's 
defamation claim because South Carolina has not adopted the discovery rule in 
libel or slander cases).  The limitations period for any claim asserted under a 
federal court's supplemental jurisdiction is "tolled while the claim is pending and 
for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer 
tolling period." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2012).  
The trial court found Harris's defamation claims relating to (1) the February 9, 
2007 email, (2) Tietex suspending Harris's employment, and (3) Tietex "banning" 
Harris from the laboratory were barred by the statute of limitations because Harris 
3 The trial court also found the qualified privilege applied to the February 9, 2007 
email. Harris does not challenge this finding on appeal.
62 

  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                        
 
 
 
 
admitted his defamation claim in the first action was not based on these 
"statements."4  Accordingly, the trial court found the limitations period for these 
claims was not tolled by the first action.  We agree with the trial court's analysis.   
Furthermore, we note that although Harris's complaint in the first action did not 
identify the specific statements on which his defamation claim was based, Harris 
did allege the defamatory statements had been made "since his termination." The
three defamation claims the trial court found to be barred by the statute of 
limitations were based on statements or acts that occurred prior to Harris's 
termination.  Accordingly, Harris's defamation claim in the first action was 
obviously not based on these "statements," and the limitations period for a claim
based on these "statements" was not tolled by the first action.
Additionally, although not ruled upon by the trial court, a review of the record 
shows that any claim based on statements contained in the memos is also barred by 
the statute of limitations for this same reason.  Harris filed his original complaint in 
the current action on October 21, 2011, a date later than two years after the three 
internal memos were written and sent.  Because Harris's defamation claims based 
on the memos were not tolled by the first action, those claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations.  See § 15-3-550 (providing that the statute of limitations for 
actions for libel and slander is two years). 
III. REMAINING ISSUES 
In light of our finding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
based on the qualified privilege and the statute of limitations, we decline to address 
the remaining issues on appeal.  See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, 
4 The trial court correctly noted in its order that Tietex instructing Harris not to 
enter the laboratory was not a statement about Harris but merely a work directive; 
therefore, it could not form the basis of a defamation claim.  The trial court also 
correctly noted the only statements related to Harris's suspension were (1)
Wallace's statement to Harris informing him of his suspension, which could not 
support a defamation claim because there was no publication to a third party, and 
(2) an allegation Wallace informed an individual at another company of Harris's 
suspension, which Harris had only provided inadmissible hearsay evidence of, and, 
even if Wallace made the statement, it could not form the basis of a defamation 
claim because the statement was true.
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Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address other 
issues raised by the appellant because resolution of a prior issue was dispositive of 
the appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's grant of summary judgment is 
AFFIRMED. 

THOMAS, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur. 
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WILLIAMS, J.:  In this zoning case, the City of Charleston (the City), the City of 
Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals (the Board), the Andrew Pinckney Inn, and 
Michael A. Molony (collectively "Appellants") appeal the circuit court's reversal of 
the Board's denial of Arkay, LLC's (Arkay) application for a special use exception 
to operate a carriage horse stable.  Appellants contend the court erred in (1) finding 
the special use exception ordinance described a stable as a "use" rather than a 
physical structure, (2) relying upon the law of horizontal property regime (HPR) as 
a means of satisfying the separation requirement, and (3) failing to reconcile and 
construe the zoning and tourism ordinances in a consistent manner.  We reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Robert R. Knoth owns and operates Carolina Polo & Carriage Company (Carolina 
Polo), one of five franchised horse carriage tour businesses in Charleston, South 
Carolina. From 1990 to 1996, Carolina Polo's stable was located at 45 Pinckney 
Street in the historic City Market District.  After losing its lease, Carolina Polo 
relocated to a building on the other side of the same block at 16 Hayne Street.  
From 1996 to 2009, another horse carriage company ran its business out of the 45 
Pinckney Street location. In 2013, Carolina Polo lost its lease at 16 Hayne Street, 
but Knoth was able to purchase the prior location at 45 Pinckney Street.  Knoth 
placed the property title in the name of Arkay, of which he is the sole member.  
In the mid-1990s, the Charleston City Council (the Council) enacted legislation 
under its zoning code to regulate the horse carriage tour business in the city.  
Pursuant to section 54-206(p) of the City of Charleston Code of Ordinances 
(2015), horse stables are permitted in general business and urban commercial 
zoning districts if they are granted a special use exception by the Board.  The 
Board must grant a special use exception if it finds an applicant has met seven 
criteria, including when a stable is not located within 100 feet of a residentially 
zoned district. From the adoption of this legislation until 2009, 45 Pinckney 
Street—located within 100 feet of a residential district—operated as a 
nonconforming use under the City's zoning ordinances. 
At the time of Arkay's purchase, the 45 Pinckney Street building no longer 
qualified as a nonconforming use because it was not used as a horse stable for 
more than three years between 2009 and 2013.  Accordingly, in March 2013, 
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Arkay applied for a special use exception to operate a stable at 45 Pinckney 
Street—a property zoned for general business—to house Carolina Polo's carriage 
horses. The Preservation Society of Charleston, the Historic Ansonborough 
Neighborhood Association, and several neighbors opposed the application.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Arkay conceded the frontage of the building at 45 Pinckney 
Street was within 93.5 feet of the closest residential district to the north.  Arkay 
argued, however, that the separation requirement only applied to the use of 
stabling, not the physical structure. 
To separate the "stabling activity" from the residential district, Arkay proposed an 
HPR to divide the building at 45 Pinckney Street into two units.  In the southern 
rear portion of the building, Unit A would consist of six stalls in which the horses 
would be fed, groomed, and stored.  In the northern front portion of the building, 
Unit B would contain two offices and be subject to an appurtenant easement for the 
benefit of Unit A for ingress and egress to Pinckney Street.  Unit B would also be 
subject to a recorded covenant prohibiting the use of that space as a stable.  
Additionally, Units A and B would be separated in the middle of the building by a 
common area consisting of two tack rooms, two restrooms, an area for customer 
waiting, and an area for customer loading and unloading.  Because its horse stalls 
would be located 119 feet from the nearest residential zone, Arkay contended the 
stabling activity complied with the zoning ordinance's separation requirement.  
Alternatively, Arkay applied for a de minimis variance of 6.5%, arguing only half 
of the frontage of the building failed to meet the 100-foot requirement by 6.5 feet.   
After hearing from Arkay, the zoning administrator, and other interested parties, 
the Board denied the application on June 4, 2013, finding the stable did not meet 
the 100-foot separation requirement.  In reaching its decision, the Board rejected 
Arkay's argument that the ordinance described "stable" as a use and not a physical 
structure. The Board noted only one building occupies 45 Pinckney Street and the 
proposed HPR did not alter that circumstance.  The east, west, and south sides of 
the building share common walls with neighbors, and the front of the building is 
flush with the sidewalk. While Arkay would store the horses in Unit A, the Board 
found the building contained only one access to a public street and the horses 
would have to pass through Unit B to reach Pinckney Street.  Because Unit B and 
the proposed appurtenant easement were areas within 100 feet of a residentially 
zoned district, the Board held 45 Pinckney Street did not qualify as a site for a 
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stable under the zoning ordinance.  The Board also denied Arkay's application for a 
variance in a separate order on June 4, 2013.  
Arkay subsequently appealed the Board's orders to the circuit court.  The court 
issued an order on May 30, 2014,1 and Appellants filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, 
motion to alter or amend judgment.  In response, the court issued a corrected order 
dated June 19, 2014, reversing the Board's order denying Arkay's application for a 
special use exception. Through a plain reading analysis of section 54-206, the 
court held the zoning ordinance's separation requirement applied only to the use of 
stabling, not the physical structure.  The court first noted section 54-206 is titled 
"[s]pecial exception uses" and regulates nineteen different uses of property that can 
qualify for special zoning exceptions.  Accordingly, the court found that, with few 
exceptions, the special uses set forth in section 54-206 describe specific forms of 
activity. 
Additionally, the court stated the requirements for a stable in section 54-206(p) 
focus on the use of the property as a horse carriage tour business, not the physical 
building. Noting section 54-206(p)(2) requires that "[t]he City of Charleston 
Tourism Commission has issued a Certificate of Appropriateness for the stable,"  
the court reasoned the certificate described in the City's tourism chapter is not 
issued for a stable, but rather for a horse carriage vehicle.  Thus, the court found 
the certificate is an aspect of the "use" of the property in general.  Similarly, the 
court found section 54-206(p)(4) prohibits the cleaning, loading, and tacking areas 
from impeding traffic flow in a public right of way and, therefore, is another 
regulation on the use of the property. 
Most noteworthy, the court found section 54-206(p)(7) requires that "[b]uildings 
[be] designed utilizing appropriate ventilation to prevent objectionable odors from 
being emitted."  In contrast, the court noted section 54-206(p)(1) only prohibits the 
"stable" from being located within 100 feet of any residentially zoned district, not 
the "buildings."  Thus, the court found the Council only intended that the stabling 
activity and potentially obnoxious characteristics of housing horses be subject to 
the separation requirement.  
1 This order was not included in the record on appeal. 
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The court also noted the city tourism chapter defines stable as "the barn where the 
animals are kept."  In the urban context of downtown Charleston, the court 
reasoned the word kept means "preserved or maintained," which would be 
accomplished by Arkay's proposed HPR.  Lastly, the court held the Board erred in 
measuring the distance of separation from the nearest residential district to the 
easement, instead of measuring it to the "use" as a stable.  The court explained "the 
horses will no more be 'kept' on the access easement [than] they would be 'kept' on 
the streets of Charleston through which they come and go every day, and from
which they enter 45 Pinckney Street."  Because its reversal on the special use 
exception was dispositive, the court found it unnecessary to address the Board's 
order denying Arkay's application for a variance.  This appeal followed.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate court gives "great deference to the decisions of those charged with 
interpreting and applying local zoning ordinances."  Gurganious v. City of 
Beaufort, 317 S.C. 481, 487, 454 S.E.2d 912, 916 (Ct. App. 1995).  This court will 
not reverse a zoning board's decision unless the board's findings of fact have no 
evidentiary support or the board commits an error of law.  Charleston Cty. Parks & 
Recreation Comm'n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995). 
"[I]ssues involving the construction of an ordinance are reviewed as a matter of 
law under a broader standard of review than is applied in reviewing issues of fact."  
Mikell v. Cty. of Charleston, 386 S.C. 153, 158, 687 S.E.2d 326, 329 (2009).  "The 
determination of legislative intent is a matter of law."  Somers, 319 S.C. at 67, 459 
S.E.2d at 843. 
LAW/ANALYSIS  
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in finding the special use exception 
ordinance described a stable as a use rather than a physical structure.  According to 
Appellants, in doing so, the court failed to reconcile and construe the zoning and 
tourism ordinances in a consistent manner.  Moreover, Appellants contend the 
court erred in relying upon the law of HPR as a means of satisfying the separation 
requirement. We agree. 
A governing body's "intent embodied in an ordinance 'must prevail if it can be 
reasonably discovered in the language used.'" Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of 
69 

  
Myrtle Beach, 360 S.C. 459, 466, 360 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting 
Somers, 319 S.C. at 67, 459 S.E.2d at 843).  "An ordinance must receive a 
practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, 
and policy of the lawmakers." Somers, 319 S.C. at 68, 459 S.E.2d at 843.  "In 
construing ordinances, the terms used must be taken in their ordinary and popular 
meaning." Id. "Moreover, it is well-settled that statutes dealing with the same 
subject matter are in pari materia and must be construed together, if possible, to 
produce a single, harmonious result."  Beaufort Cty. v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 
395 S.C. 366, 371, 718 S.E.2d 432, 435 (2011).  
 
The ordinance at issue in this case, section 54-206(p), provides the following 
requirements a stable must meet to receive a special use exception: 
 
Stables shall be permitted within the GB and UC district 
as an exception where the Board, after review, finds that: 
 
1. The stable is not located within 100 feet of any 
residential zone district. 
2. The City of Charleston Tourism Commission has 
issued a Certificate of Appropriateness for the stable. 
3. The stable complies with all city, county, and state 
regulations for stables. 
4. A site plan is provided showing that the 
cleaning/loading/tacking area shall not impede traffic 
flow in a public right-of-way. 
5. A written explanation is submitted detailing how 
refuse will be handled in accordance with city, 
county, state, and federal regulations.  This shall be 
reviewed by the Department of Public Service. 
6. A plan is submitted showing how drainage on the 
property is to be collected in accordance with city, 
county, state, and federal regulations.  This shall be 
reviewed by the Commissioners of Public Works and 
the Department of Public Service. 
7. Buildings are designed utilizing appropriate 
ventilation to prevent objectionable odors from being 
emitted. 
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At the outset, we note the ordinance's seven requirements do not describe "uses" of 
the property, but rather establish firm prerequisites on how the stable must be 
configured and how it must operate to receive a special use exception from the 
Board. Additionally, we disagree with the circuit court's finding that the Council 
made a relevant distinction between a stable and a building in section 54-206(p)(7) 
because a stable already comes under the definition of a building in the zoning 
code. See Charleston, S.C., Code of Ordinances § 54-120 (2015) (defining a 
building as "[a]ny structure built for the support, shelter, housing[,] or enclosure of 
persons, animals[,] or property of any kind" (emphasis added)).  Thus, we find— 
and it seems all parties agree—that section 54-206(p)(1) applies the 100-foot 
separation requirement to a physical location.  Consequently, our focus turns to 
whether the Council intended such physical location to mean a structure or the 
exact place where horses are kept.   
"Stable" is not defined in the City's zoning code.  See § 54-120. Section 54-
206(p)(3), however, requires that stable operators abide by city regulations for 
stables. Thus, to further gauge legislative intent on what constitutes a stable, we 
must examine the City's tourism chapter, which provides for substantial regulation 
of horse carriage businesses operating in Charleston.2 See Beaufort Cty., 395 S.C. 
at 371, 718 S.E.2d at 435 (holding that "statutes dealing with the same subject 
matter are in pari materia and must be construed together, if possible, to produce a 
single, harmonious result").   
Enacted in 2007, section 29-212 of the City of Charleston Code of Ordinances 
(2015) specifically focuses on the management of carriage horse businesses and 
differentiates between stables and stalls.  Subsection 29-212(b)(12) defines stable 
as "the barn where the animals are kept."  On the other hand, section 29-212(b)(13) 
2 On appeal, Arkay contends it is not appropriate to consider definitions in the 
tourism code as a part of the analysis because section 29-212(b) precludes their 
application to the zoning code providing that, "[e]xcept where the context clearly 
indicates otherwise, the following terms and phrases as used in this section shall 
have the following meanings."  We disagree because the context of the relevant 
zoning and tourism sections is the regulation of horse carriage businesses in 
Charleston. 
71 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
defines stall as the "individual space within the barn where each animal is kept."  
Thus, stalls are a smaller component of the larger entity that is the stable.  
In the case of 45 Pinckney Street, because the building that would keep the horses 
encompasses the entire lot, we find it is a barn for purposes of the ordinance.  Even 
though the horses would be kept in the rear of the building—and would be 
separated from the street by areas for customers, tack rooms, restrooms, and 
offices—this does not change the building's status as a barn.  Moreover, we find 
these areas and rooms in the front portion of 45 Pinckney Street are commonly 
associated with horse stables.   The obnoxious elements—no matter how minimal 
in scope Arkay claims they will be—are still likely to accumulate in these areas 
and escape through the front gate abutting Pinckney Street, the building's only 
point of access. 
Additionally, Arkay's proposed definition of stable as meaning only where the 
horses are kept essentially undermines a number of important provisions regulating 
stables. See, e.g., Charleston, S.C., Code of Ordinances § 29-212(i)(1)(j) ("There 
shall be no smoking at any time in stables."); § 29-212(i)(3) ("All stables shall 
have a yearly inspection by the fire department."); § 29-212(i)(1)(i) ("Interior and 
exterior areas of the stable shall be kept clean, properly drained[,] and free of 
nuisances including, but not limited to, unreasonable and excessive odors and 
unreasonable accumulation of refuse and excreta.").  Arkay's construction of stable
would not prohibit smoking in 45 Pinckney Street's customer waiting, loading, and 
unloading areas that are directly adjacent to the horse stalls.  Further, the fire 
department would only have to annually inspect the horse stalls instead of the 
entire building for fire hazards.  Likewise, Arkay would only have to clean the 
horse stalls and the areas surrounding them, but not the sidewalk area on Pinckney 
Street. Accordingly, we find Arkay's interpretation leads to absurd results.  See 
Lancaster Cty. Bar Ass'n v. S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Def., 380 S.C. 219, 222, 670 
S.E.2d 371, 373 (2008) (holding a court will reject an interpretation when it would 
lead to an absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislative body).
Based upon our review of the language of the relevant ordinances, we find the 
Council intended to apply the 100-foot separation requirement in subsection 54-
206(p)(1) to a physical structure operating as a stable—such as the building at 45 
Pinckney Street—and not merely to stalls that house the horses.  The purpose of 
the various requirements of section 54-206(p) is to protect the health and safety of 
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city patrons and carriage horses, while distancing the unwelcome elements of a 
barn, including noise, odors, waste, drainage, and pests from residential areas.  The 
circuit court's finding that the ordinance describes the stable in subsection 54-
206(p)(1) as a use, rather than a physical structure, runs afoul of the purpose for 
which the ordinance was enacted.  Therefore, mindful of our deferential standard 
of review, we hold the circuit court erred in reversing the Board's denial of Arkay's 
application for a special use exception.  See Gurganious, 317 S.C. at 487, 454 
S.E.2d at 916 (noting the appellate court gives "great deference to the decisions of 
those charged with interpreting and applying local zoning ordinances").   
Likewise, we find the circuit court erred in relying upon the law of HPR in holding 
Arkay satisfied the separation requirement.3 
Under the South Carolina Horizontal Property Act,4 an owner of real property may 
establish an HPR through the recordation of a master deed.  See S.C. Code. Ann. 
§ 27-31-30 (2007). A property's conversion to an HPR divides the ownership 
interest in the property but does not subdivide the land itself.  Penny Creek Assocs., 
LLC v. Fenwick Tarragon Apartments, LLC, 375 S.C. 267, 274, 651 S.E.2d 617, 
621 (Ct. App. 2007). 
In our view, Arkay's proposed HPR for 45 Pinckney Street does not change the 
status of the building as a stable because it does not vertically subdivide the 
building itself. See Penny Creek, 375 S.C. at 274, 651 S.E.2d at 621 (concluding 
that, under an HPR, "the property and common areas remain intact and the owner 
3 Arkay argues the circuit court did not rely upon its proposed HPR in holding that 
Arkay satisfied the 100-foot separation requirement.  Arkay contends the proposed 
HPR was simply a showing of good faith to the Board, as well as the public, that 
no horse stalls would be located in Unit B on the north end of the building within 
100 feet of a residential district.  We disagree, however, because the circuit court 
specifically mentioned the HPR in holding the Board erred in measuring the 
separation distance from the access easement instead of the stabling use.  The court 
also acknowledged the proposed restrictive covenant for Unit B—which could 
only be accomplished through the proposed HPR—would prohibit horses from
being kept in Unit B.  
4 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-31-10 through -440 (2007 & Supp. 2015).  
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merely grants a share of his ownership interest in these areas to purchasers").  Unit 
B, the easement, the tack rooms, the restrooms, and the customer areas would all 
be underneath the roof of the building, and the building is within 100 feet of a 
residentially zoned district. Therefore, we find the court erred in considering 
Arkay's proposed HPR for 45 Pinckney Street in reaching its decision.   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, because we find Arkay's proposed stable at 45 Pinckney 
Street failed to meet the separation requirement of subsection 54-206(p)(1), we 
hold the circuit court erred in reversing the Board's denial of Arkay's application 
for a special use exception to operate a carriage horse stable.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court's order is 
REVERSED. 
HUFF, J., concurs. 
THOMAS, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I agree with the circuit court that 
the City of Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals erred in denying Arkay a special 
exception use permit. 
This appeal involves the interpretation of section 54-206(p) of the City of 
Charleston Code of Ordinances (2015).  The majority holds the circuit court erred 
in reversing the Board's denial of Arkay's application for a special use exception 
and bases this holding on (1) a deferential standard of review in deciding how to 
apply subsection 54-206(p)(1),  under which a stable may operate as a special 
exception use in certain zoning districts if, among other criteria, "[t]he stable is not 
located within 100 feet of any residential zone district"; and (2) an examination of 
ordinances from the City of Charleston Tourism Ordinances.  In reaching its 
decision, the majority finds the City Council intended to apply the 100-foot 
separation requirement to the building at 45 Pinckney Street, which, as the circuit 
court observed, is built on the "zero lot line" with its northern façade constructed 
flush with the sidewalk, rather than to the specific part of the building that would 
be used for Arkay's stable.   
I agree with the majority that, as appellate tribunals, this court and the circuit court 
must "give great deference to the decisions of those charged with interpreting and 
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applying local zoning ordinances."  Gurganious v. City of Beaufort, 317 S.C. 481, 
487, 454 S.E.2d 912, 916 (Ct. App. 1995).  However, "[i]ssues involving the 
construction of ordinances are reviewed as a matter of law under a broader 
standard of review than is applied in reviewing issues of fact."  Mitchell v. City of 
Greenville, 411 S.C. 632, 634, 770 S.E.2d 391, 392 (2015); see also Mikell v. Cty. 
of Charleston, 386 S.C. 153, 158, 687 S.E.2d 326, 329 (2009) ("Although great 
deference is accorded the decisions of those charged with interpreting and applying 
zoning ordinances, 'a broader and more independent review is permitted when the 
issue concerns the construction of an ordinance.'" (quoting Eagle Container Co., 
LLC v. Cty. of Newberry, 379 S.C. 564, 568, 666 S.E.2d 892, 894 (2008))). 
I would interpret section 54-206(p) solely through common sense scrutiny of its 
plain language and would not resort to subordinate rules concerning the 
construction of statutes.  See McClanahan v. Richland Cty. Council, 350 S.C. 433, 
438, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002) ("All rules of statutory construction are 
subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can reasonably be 
discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light 
of the intended purpose of the statute."); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 
S.E.2d 578, 584 (2000) ("What a legislature says in the text of a statute is 
considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.  Therefore, the courts 
are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature." (quoting 
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992)); 
Rabon v. S.C. State Highway Dep't, 258 S.C. 154, 157, 187 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1972) 
(stating the rule that statutes are to be construed in pari materia "may be applied 
where there is an ambiguity to be resolved and not where . . . the meaning of the 
statute is clear and unambiguous"). 
Although buildings where horses are kept are commonly referred to as stables, a 
stable is different from other buildings because of the activities that take place 
within it, namely, the feeding, sheltering, and care of domestic animals.  To 
include other uses such office space, restrooms, or a customer waiting area as part 
of a stable merely because they are housed within the same physical structure is 
not supported by any grammatical analysis or by any construction of any provision 
of the Charleston City Code. 
Particularly significant in the present case is the final requirement in section 54-
206(p) to obtain special exception approval for a stable.  This requirement reads as 
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follows: "Buildings are designed utilizing appropriate ventilation to prevent 
objectionable odors from being emitted."  Charleston, S.C. Code of Ordinances § 
54-206(p)(7) (2015) (emphasis added).  As the circuit court observed, the City 
Council, in using the word "building" when referring to a physical structure, 
"envisioned a physical circumstance such as is presented in this case, where the use 
of the property as a 'stable' is but one of several uses contained in a larger 
'building.'" See Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 
453 (1993) ("It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law 
of this [S]tate without the intention of thereby conveying some meaning."); Nexsen 
v. Ward, 96 S.C. 313, 321, 80 S.E. 599, 601 (1914) ("The rule sustained by all the 
courts requires that every word, clause, and sentence must be given some meaning, 
force, and effect, if it can be done by any reasonable construction." (quoted in 
Breeden v. TCW, Inc./Tenn. Express, 355 S.C. 112, 120 n.7, 584 S.E.2d 379, 383 
n.7 (2003))). 
Furthermore, the specific requirement in subsection 54-206(p)(7) that "[b]uildings 
[be] designed using appropriate ventilation to prevent objectionable odors from
being emitted" shows a recognition that stables are likely to be located in buildings 
that are also used for other purposes.  To impose such sanitation measures on an 
entire building in which a stable is located shows prudent consideration of the need 
to avoid undesirable consequences that could not be avoided if such measures were 
required only within the stable itself. 
The majority correctly notes that subsection 29-212(b)(12) of the City of 
Charleston Code of Ordinances (2015)  defines "stable" as "the barn where the 
animals are kept."  As I have previously noted, it is not necessary to construe this 
ordinance together with section 54-206(p) with the objective of producing "a 
single, harmonious result."  Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 
S.C. 452, 470, 636 S.E.2d 598, 607 (2006).  Nevertheless, in response to the 
majority's reliance on parts of the City of Charleston Tourism Ordinances to 
support its holding, I note the definitions provided in section 29-212(b) apply only 
"as used in this section" and, even within this limitation, do not apply "where the 
context clearly indicates otherwise."  Charleston, S.C. Code of Ordinances § 29-
212(b) (2015).
Finally, notwithstanding the reference in the appealed order to the proposed 
horizontal property regime and the finding based on the regime plot plan that the 
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100-foot separation requirement was satisfied, I agree with the respondents that 
there was no need to create a horizontal property regime in order to obtain a special 
exception use permit.  Rather, the purpose of the regime is to provide assurance to 
the City and the public that the physical space where the horses would be kept, i.e., 
the stable in Unit A, will be at least 100 feet from the nearest residential district 
and in compliance with section 54-206(p). 
I would therefore affirm the appealed order. 
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MCDONALD, J.: Darryl Frierson (Petitioner) pled guilty to kidnapping, armed 
robbery, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and 
criminal conspiracy.  He appeals from the denial of his application for post-
conviction relief (PCR), arguing the PCR court erred in not finding his guilty plea 
was involuntary due to counsel's failure to advise him he could move to suppress 
evidence stemming from the placement of a mobile tracking device on his car.  We 
affirm.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
On May 10, 2007, Petitioner and his co-conspirators stole approximately 9.8 
million dollars from an Express Tellers Services (ETS) armored truck.  ETS 
employees David Jones (Jones) and Petitioner drove the truck from Charleston to 
Columbia, where two co-conspirators—Jeremy McPhail (McPhail) and Dominic 
Lyde (Lyde)—attacked Jones while he refueled, pushed him into the truck, and 
restrained him.  The co-conspirators drove the truck away and stopped in a field, 
where two other co-conspirators—Domonique Blakney (Domonique) and Kelby 
Blakney (Kelby)—transferred money from the truck into a different car, left Jones 
and Petitioner in the truck, and fled. 
Despite suffering substantial injuries, Jones was able to free himself and walk to a 
nightclub to call the police. Officers responding to the scene found Petitioner still 
inside the armored truck.  Petitioner self-reported injuries and was transported to 
the hospital, where a team of investigators came to interview him.  
Petitioner provided a fictitious account of the incident that immediately alerted 
investigators to the possibility of dishonesty.  For example, although it was dark 
outside at the time of the heist and Petitioner alleged he was too injured to escape 
the abandoned armored car, he provided a very detailed account of the surrounding 
crime scene.  During a follow-up interview at the police station, officers became 
more suspicious when they saw Petitioner through the two-way mirror freely 
moving his arm, despite his claims of injury to his arm and shoulder.  Petitioner 
failed a polygraph test and had no duct tape residue or significant injuries such as 
those suffered by Jones.  At this point, the investigative team at the police station 
determined Petitioner was a suspect, not a victim, and placed a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) tracking device on Petitioner's car—without a warrant or court 
order—before he left the police department.   
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Although the Richland County Sheriff's Department's led the detectives working 
on the case, dozens of additional law enforcement officers from across the state 
took part in the investigation.  While Petitioner was being interviewed at the 
station, a separate team of officers was examining the armored truck.  They 
collected a blue latex glove from inside the truck that was identical to a glove 
found in the trash abandoned on the street outside Petitioner's house.  In addition, 
officers interviewing other ETS employees learned that Paul Whitaker (Whitaker), 
another co-conspirator,1 and Petitioner were friends.  When police questioned 
Whitaker, he became upset, started crying, and immediately confessed to his role 
in the scheme. According to Whitaker's statement, Petitioner had been planning to 
rob the armored truck for several months.  Police searched Whitaker's house, 
where they discovered a large amount of cash and receipts from Petitioner's recent 
purchases. Based on Whitaker's confession and the evidence gathered at his home, 
police obtained a warrant for Petitioner's arrest.   
Monitoring the tracking device on Petitioner's car, police located him driving with 
Domonique and found several thousand dollars in cash in the car.  Police arrested 
Petitioner and interviewed Petitioner and Domonique in separate rooms at the 
police department.  On Domonique's cell phone, officers found pictures of large 
bags of money. Domonique subsequently gave a statement admitting his role in 
the robbery and implicating Petitioner as the "mastermind."  After police told 
Petitioner about Domonique's statement, Petitioner waived his rights and confessed 
to his involvement in the heist.   
In September 2007, a grand jury indicted Petitioner for kidnapping, armed robbery, 
ABHAN, and criminal conspiracy.  Domonique, Kelby, McPhail, Lyde, and 
Whitaker were also indicted for their involvement in the conspiracy.         
On December 3, 2008, Petitioner pled guilty to all charges.  At the plea hearing, 
Petitioner acknowledged he understood that by pleading guilty he was waiving his 
constitutional rights, including his right to challenge the State's evidence at trial.  
Petitioner also stated he was satisfied with plea counsel's representation.  He 
1 Whitaker's role was to field phone calls from the armored truck at ETS 
headquarters to delay detection of the robbery and provide the co-conspirators time 
to flee. 
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testified plea counsel reviewed with him and explained his charges, his potential 
sentences, and his constitutional rights, allowing him to make an informed and 
intelligent decision about whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial.  The plea 
court accepted Petitioner's guilty plea but deferred sentencing until a later 
proceeding. 
On August 24, 2009, the plea court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent sentences of 
thirty years' imprisonment for kidnapping, thirty years' imprisonment for armed 
robbery, and ten years' imprisonment for ABHAN, as well as a consecutive 
sentence of five years' imprisonment for criminal conspiracy.  
Petitioner filed a PCR application, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  At 
the PCR hearing, Petitioner testified that plea counsel's lack of confidence about 
the outcome of a trial prompted Petitioner to plead guilty despite his desire to go to 
trial. Petitioner also stated plea counsel influenced him to plead guilty by telling 
him his co-defendants would testify against him at trial.   
Petitioner further testified he asked plea counsel to research the legality of the 
placement of the GPS tracking device because damaging evidence stemmed from
the use of the device. According to Petitioner, plea counsel did not discover 
section 17-30-140 of the South Carolina Code (2014), which requires a warrant or 
court order for the placement of tracking devices.  Plea counsel told Petitioner the 
placement of the tracking device on the outside of the vehicle was legal based on 
his research. However, Petitioner testified he would not have pled guilty and 
would have proceeded to trial if plea counsel had advised him of section 17-30-140 
and his ability to challenge the search and use of the resulting evidence. 
Plea counsel testified he advised Petitioner to plead guilty because he believed 
Petitioner's chances of succeeding at trial were "very slim" based on his statement 
confessing to his involvement in the plan and the likelihood his co-conspirators 
would have testified against him.  Plea counsel explained he researched the 
constitutionality of the tracking device after learning it was installed without a 
warrant or court order, however, he was unable to find any South Carolina case 
law addressing the issue. Plea counsel explained that in light of United States v. 
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Knotts2 and the placement of the tracking device on the outside of Petitioner's 
vehicle, he believed Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated.   
Plea counsel admitted he was unaware of section 17-30-140 at the time of 
Petitioner's plea, did not find it in his research, and did not discuss it with 
Petitioner. He further testified, however, that he believed the statute was 
applicable to Petitioner's case and could have been used in an attempt to suppress 
some of the incriminating evidence.  Plea counsel asserted that if he had been 
aware of section 17-30-140, he would have filed a motion to suppress Petitioner's 
confession and his co-defendants' confessions, arguing they were the fruit of the 
poisonous tree stemming from the warrantless use of the tracking device.  Plea 
counsel contended Petitioner's confession was the most damaging evidence against 
him, and he believed Petitioner would have had a "fighting chance" at trial if a 
motion to suppress the confession had succeeded.   
The PCR court denied Petitioner's PCR application, finding he failed to prove 
deficient performance or resulting prejudice.  It found plea counsel's testimony was 
credible while Petitioner's testimony was "wholly incredible." Analyzing the 
deficiency prong set forth in Strickland v. Washington,3 the PCR court found plea 
counsel "performed extensive investigation into the GPS monitoring issue" and 
reasonably relied on Supreme Court case law in determining there was no Fourth
Amendment violation "based on the status of the law at the time."  It found plea 
counsel fully advised Petitioner about the ability to challenge the evidence based 
on his research. 
Analyzing the prejudice prong, the PCR court found Petitioner failed to 
demonstrate he would have proceeded to trial but for counsel's failure to discover 
the statute and challenge the placement of the tracking device.  Moreover, the PCR 
2 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding police's placement and monitoring of a tracking 
beeper in a container of chemicals that the defendant later placed in his car was 
neither a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because the device 
only exposed information about the defendant's movements on public roads, for 
which there was no reasonable expectation of privacy).    
3 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting forth the two-pronged test of deficient 
performance and prejudice that a PCR applicant must satisfy to establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
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court found that even if plea counsel had successfully achieved the suppression of 
the evidence stemming from the tracking device, the outcome of Petitioner's case 
would not have been different because there was overwhelming evidence of his 
guilt. 
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari, which this court granted on February 22, 
2014. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a PCR proceeding, the applicant has the burden of establishing he is entitled to 
relief. Terry v. State, 383 S.C. 361, 370, 680 S.E.2d 277, 282 (2009).  An appellate 
court gives great deference to a PCR court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Id. at 371, 680 S.E.2d at 282. "[An appellate court] will uphold the findings 
of the PCR court when there is any evidence of probative value to support them, 
and will reverse the decision of the PCR court when it is controlled by an error of 
law." Id.  "[An appellate court] gives great deference to a PCR [court’s] findings 
where matters of credibility are involved."  Simuel v. State, 390 S.C. 267, 270, 701 
S.E.2d 738, 739 (2010). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Petitioner argues plea counsel was deficient in failing to locate section 17-30-140 
and failing to advise Petitioner of his ability to challenge the admissibility of his 
confession and other critical evidence.  Petitioner further argues the PCR court 
erred in finding he was not prejudiced because the evidence established a 
reasonable probability that he would have not have pled guilty and would have 
proceeded to trial but for counsel's deficiency.  We disagree. 
Clearly, a defendant entering a guilty plea is entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).  To establish a claim of 
ineffective assistance, however, a PCR applicant must prove counsel's performance 
was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced him.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687. "A defendant who enters a plea on the advice of counsel may only attack 
the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have 
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pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial."  Kolle v. State, 386 S.C. 
578, 588, 690 S.E.2d 73, 78 (2010) (quoting Rolen v. State, 384 S.C. 409, 413, 683 
S.E.2d 471, 474 (2009)). 
In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong "focuses on whether counsel's
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process."  
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Ordinarily, a PCR applicant must show some evidence "that 
would have affected counsel's advice to [him] to accept the plea bargain offered or 
that would have caused [him] to decline to accept it."  Stalk v. State, 383 S.C. 559, 
563, 681 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009). "In many guilty plea cases, the 'prejudice'
inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing 
ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial."  Hill, 474 
U.S. at 59. 
Like the PCR court, in conducting the prejudice analysis, we must consider the 
evolution of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence applicable to the use of tracking 
devices on public roadways. Our supreme court recently considered this history in 
State v. Adams, explaining,
In Knotts, law enforcement, with the owner's consent, 
concealed a beeper in a container of chloroform that was 
eventually loaded onto a target vehicle. Law 
enforcement then monitored the beeper and maintained 
surveillance on the target vehicle, ultimately arresting 
Knotts several days after he took possession of the 
container. The Supreme Court found no Fourth
Amendment violation, upholding the warrantless use of 
the beeper because "[a] person travelling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place 
to another." 
One year later, in Karo,[4] the Supreme Court "addressed 
the question left open by Knotts, whether the installation 
4 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
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of a beeper in a container amounted to a search or 
seizure." In Karo, law enforcement officers installed a 
beeper inside a container of chemicals prior to the 
container being transferred to the buyer.  "As in Knotts, 
at the time the beeper was installed the container 
belonged to a third party, and it did not come into 
possession of the defendant until later." The Court held 
that, because the beeper was installed with the consent of 
the owner of the container, no search or seizure occurred 
because "[t]he mere transfer to Karo of a can containing 
an unmonitored beeper infringed no privacy interest."  
409 S.C. 641, 651–52, 763 S.E.2d 341, 347 (2014) (citations omitted) (footnote 
omitted).   
In 2002, as part of the South Carolina Homeland Security Act,5 the legislature 
enacted a statute outlining the requirements for obtaining authorization for the 
placement of a GPS tracking device.  S.C. Code Ann. § 17-30-140 (2014).  
Pursuant to the statute, "[t]he Attorney General or any solicitor may make 
application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or 
approving the installation and use of a mobile tracking device by the South 
Carolina Law Enforcement Division or any law enforcement entity of a political 
subdivision of this State." § 17-30-140(A).  "Upon application made as provided 
under subsection (B), the court, upon finding that the certification and statements 
required by subsection (B) have been made in the application and probable cause 
exists, must enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a mobile 
tracking device." § 17-30-140(C).  "The standards established by the United States 
Supreme Court for the installation and monitoring of mobile tracking devices apply 
to the installation and use of any device as authorized by this section."  § 17-30-
140(E). 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which 
upheld the reversal of a defendant's conviction on drug trafficking conspiracy 
charges. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  There, the Court found the government's
5 Act No. 339, 2002 S.C. Acts 3619.
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warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device on defendant's vehicle and its use 
of the device to monitor the vehicle's movements constituted a Fourth Amendment 
search. Id. at 949. Rejecting the government's argument that portions of the 
tracking of the Jeep Grand Cherokee's movement occurred upon public streets—on 
which defendant would have no reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
tracking device analysis of Knotts—the Supreme Court held the government's
intrusion on an "effect" (the Cherokee) for the purpose of obtaining tracking 
information constituted a search.  Id.; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV. ("The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .").    
Thereafter, our supreme court decided Adams, supra, which considered a motion to 
suppress drug evidence stemming from the placement of a GPS tracking device on 
the defendant's car without a warrant or court order.  409 S.C. 641, 763 S.E.2d 341.  
Concluding Knotts was not binding precedent6 authorizing the officers' warrantless 
placement of the GPS tracking device, the supreme court held, "Because the only 
binding law in this case was a statute that forbade law enforcement officers from 
installing a GPS device on [the defendant's] car without court authorization, there 
is no support for the State's invocation of the good-faith reliance exception as an 
additional sustaining ground to uphold the conviction."  Id. at 653, 763 S.E.2d at 
348. An "intervening acts" argument was likewise rejected because "Adams'
traffic violations provide[d] an insufficient attenuation from the taint of the illegal 
search. The traffic stop was entirely predicated on the information obtained from
the GPS device and law enforcement's desire to search Adams and his vehicle for 
drugs." Id. at 648, 763 S.E.2d at 345. 
Relying upon Jones and Adams, Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective in failing 
to locate section 17-30-140 and advise Petitioner of the possibility of moving to 
suppress based upon officers' failure to comply with its statutory warrant 
requirement. However, even if plea counsel was deficient in failing to advise 
Petitioner of section 17-30-140 in conjunction with their discussions of moving to 
suppress and attempting to challenge the legality of the GPS monitoring at trial, we 
find probative evidence supports the PCR court's finding that Petitioner failed to 
prove the prejudice necessary to support the granting of post-conviction relief.  See 
6 The United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones during the 
pendency of Adams' appeal. 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 ("Failure to make the required showing of either 
deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.").   
Although Petitioner asserted he would have proceeded to trial had plea counsel 
advised him of the statute, the PCR court found Petitioner's testimony "wholly 
incredible." See Simuel, 390 S.C. at 270, 701 S.E.2d at 739 ("[An appellate court] 
gives great deference to a PCR [court's] findings where matters of credibility are 
involved."); Stalk, 383 S.C. at 563, 681 S.E.2d at 595 ("[The] prejudice prong 
ordinarily requires more than simply a defendant's assertion that but for counsel's
deficient performance he would not have pled but would have gone to trial."); Hill, 
474 U.S. at 59 ("[I]n order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.").  At the 
time of Petitioner's guilty plea in 2008, the constitutionality of the placement of a 
GPS tracking device on a vehicle was an unsettled question of law; the United 
States Supreme Court had not decided Jones, and our supreme court had not 
decided Adams.
Instead, Knotts provided authority suggesting the placement of a GPS tracking 
device on the outside of a vehicle might not have been a constitutional violation, 
and other South Carolina courts considering the question before Jones found no 
constitutional violation under such circumstances.  See United States v. Narrl, 789 
F. Supp. 2d 645, 652 (D.S.C. 2011) ("Knotts is clear that the use of a tracking 
device to track a person's movements on public roads is not a violation of that 
person's Fourth Amendment rights."). As no clear authority concluded that the 
placement of a tracking device on a vehicle without a court order was a Fourth 
Amendment violation at the time of Petitioner's plea, we find Petitioner failed to 
establish a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed at a suppression 
hearing despite the violation of the statute. See Hutto v. State, 387 S.C. 244, 250, 
692 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (stating the exclusion of evidence should be limited to 
violations of constitutional rights and not to statutory violations); Rollison v. State, 
346 S.C. 506, 509–10, 552 S.E.2d 290, 292 (2001) (holding counsel's failure to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the legality of a weapons frisk and 
advising applicant to plead guilty did not prejudice him).  Because probative 
evidence supports the PCR court's finding that Petitioner failed to prove prejudice 
because he did not establish a reasonable probability he would have proceeded to 
trial instead of pleading guilty but for counsel's errors, we uphold the decision of 
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the PCR court. See Terry, 383 S.C. at 371, 680 S.E.2d at 282 ("[An appellate 
court] will uphold the findings of the PCR court when there is any evidence of 
probative value to support them, and will reverse the decision of the PCR court 
when it is controlled by an error of law.").  
Moreover, we find probative evidence supports the PCR court's finding that even if 
counsel had been successful in suppressing the evidence found as a result of the 
GPS tracking device, due to the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt, the 
outcome of Petitioner's case would have been no different had he chosen to 
proceed to trial. See Hutto, 387 S.C. at 249, 692 S.E.2d at 198 ("No prejudice 
occurs, despite deficient performance, when there is overwhelming evidence of 
guilt.").7  Although police used the GPS tracking device to locate Petitioner to 
execute the arrest warrant, police obtained the arrest warrant through other aspects 
of the investigation independent of the tracking device.  Police considered 
Petitioner a suspect because of his suspicious behavior and lack of injuries after the 
robbery, they located a glove outside Petitioner's house matching a glove from the 
armored truck, and Whitaker broke down and told police that Petitioner had been 
planning the heist for several months.  Even if counsel had been successful in 
having Petitioner's own confession suppressed, Petitioner would likely have lacked 
standing to challenge the pictures of money from Domonique's phone, and the co-
defendants' statements would have been admissible against him. These 
independent aspects of the investigation, as well as the other evidence unrelated to 
the GPS tracker that police developed against Petitioner, provide further probative 
7 We resolve this matter in reliance upon the "prejudice" prong of the Strickland
analysis. However, like the PCR court, we recognize the clarification of our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to the warrantless placement of 
tracking devices in United States v. Jones and State v. Adams occurred some years 
after Petitioner's guilty plea.  Our courts have "never required an attorney to be 
clairvoyant or anticipate changes in the law which were not in existence at the time 
of trial." Gilmore v. State, 314 S.C. 453, 457, 445 S.E.2d 456 (1994) overruled on 
other grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999); see 
also Robinson v. State, 308 S.C. 74, 77–78, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91–92 (1992) (holding 
defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to present evidence of battered 
woman's syndrome in support of wife's self-defense claim where trial took place 
six years before our supreme court recognized battered woman's syndrome as 
relevant to a claim of self-defense). 
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evidence supporting the PCR court's finding that Petitioner failed to establish 
prejudice. See Terry, 383 S.C. at 371, 680 S.E.2d at 282 ("[An appellate court] 
will uphold the findings of the PCR court when there is any evidence of probative 
value to support them, and will reverse the decision of the PCR court when it is 
controlled by an error of law.").  
CONCLUSION 
We conclude probative evidence supports the PCR court's finding that Petitioner 
failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, the decision of 
the PCR court is 
AFFIRMED. 
SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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